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Introduction
The debate on reforming corporate boards of directors has centered on
monitoring management to ensure that corporate board members act in the
interests of shareholders rather than in their own personal interests.1 To
1. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3A.01 (1994) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE]; AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
STRUCTURE: RESTATEMENT AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.03(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1982) [hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 1]; MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE
CORPORATION - A LEGAL ANALYSIS 169-72 (1976); ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW,
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 178-229 (1995); ABA Comm. on Corp. Laws, Corporate
Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1625 (1978); Business Roundtable, Corporate
Governance and American Competitiveness, 46 Bus. LAW. 241, 249 (1990); James D. Cox,
The AL, Institutionalization, and Disclosure: The Quest for the Outside Director's Spine,
61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1233, 1233-34 (1993); Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner Kraakman,
Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV.
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best monitor situations where managerial interests conflict with those of
shareholders (conflicts monitoring), reformers have made numerous propos-
als to make boards independent of management. Two main problems
confound these proposals. First, the proposals fail to deal adequately with
social dynamics on boards that make independent decision making difficult
when conflicted or nonindependent board members serve on the board,
namely, inside (employee) directors and outside (nonemployee) directors
with business relationships with the corporation or its management. Sec-
ond, the proposals do not take proper account of the many important rela-
tional roles of the board other than conflicts monitoring.
In recognition of the importance of an independent board to conflicts
monitoring and of the importance of the full range of relational roles of the
board that requires a mix of different kinds of directors, I propose that state
legislators modify state corporation statutes to permit public corporations
to utilize a dual board structure. This structure would consist of two
boards, each ideally composed to perform certain functions. One board,
called the conflicts board, would perform conflicts monitoring and would
be composed solely of independent directors, who are outside directors with
no business relationships with the corporation or its management. The
other board, called the business review board, would consist of a mix of
different kinds of directors and would perform other relational roles. A
full-time ombudsperson, selected by independent directors, would assist the
independent directors in performing conflicts monitoring on the conflicts
board or existing unitary boards.
Two theories of the board, contra-managerial hegemony theory2
(hegemony theory) and agency cost theory,' have provided the foundation
863, 872-76 (1991); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate
Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. CI. L. REv. 187, 187 (1991).
2. See, e.g., MONKS & MiNow, supra note 1, at 184; Lynne L. Dallas, The Rela-
tional Board: Three Theories of Corporate Boards of Directors, 22 J. CORP. L. 1, 4-8
(1996); Rita D. Kosnik, Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Gover-
nance, 32 ADMIN. Sci. Q. 163, 166-67 (1987); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside
Directors As a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L.
REv. 898, 912-17 (1996); Paul Mallette & Karen L. Fowler, The Effects of Board Composi-
tion and Stock Ownership on the Adoption of "Poison Pills," 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1010,
1014 (1992); John A. Pearce, II & Shaker A. Zahra, Board Composition from a Strategic
Contingency Perspective, 29 J. MGMT. STUD. 411, 413-14 (1992).
3. See, e.g., Dallas, supra note 2, at 8-10; Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Agency Problems and Resiual Claims, 26 J.L. & ECON. 327, 327 (1983) [hereinafter Fama
& Jensen, Agency Problems]; Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the
Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 288-89 (1980); Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,
Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301-11 (1983) [hereinafter
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for the debate on corporate board reform. Both theories are conflicts
monitoring theories. While hegemony theorists have given some attention
to psychological factors that may hinder independent decision making by
board members, they have not gone far enough in recognizing the substan-
tial conformity pressures on board members. Both hegemony and agency
cost theorists are content with a board containing inside directors and
outside directors with business relationships with the corporation or its
management.4 As this Article suggests, such a board would be less effec-
tive at conflicts monitoring than a board composed solely of independent
directors.
The focus on conflicts monitoring by prevailing legal theories, how-
ever, gives inadequate attention to other important roles of corporate
boards. To explore these roles, reference is made to a broader theory of
the board, the power coalition theory,5 which is widely accepted in the busi-
Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control]; Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate
Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REv. 1259, 1262-65 (1982); Kosnik, supra note 2, at
67-69; Mallette & Fowler, supra note 2, at 1014-15; Shaker A. Zahra & John A. Pearce,
H, Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A Review and Integrative
Model, 15 J. MGMT. 291, 301-03 (1989); see also Michael C. Jensen & William H.
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior; Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3 J. FiN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976); Benjamin Klein, Contracting Costs and Residual
Claims: The Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & EcON. 367, 367-68 (1983);
William A. Klein, The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints, 91
YALE L.J. 1521, 1521-26 (1982); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 258-62 (1977).
4. See, e.g., EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 174-75; Fama & Jensen, Separation of
Ownershio and Control, supra note 3, at 315; see also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GovER-
NANCE, supra note 1, § 3A.01; Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, § 3.03(a); ABA
Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 1, at 1624-25; Business Roundtable, supra note 1, at
249.
5. See Dallas, supra note 2, at 23-24; Zahra & Pearce, supra note 3, at 292-303; see
also Lynne L. Dallas, Two Models of Corporate Governance: Beyond Berle and Means, 22
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 19, 30-31 (1988) [hereinafter Dallas, Two Models]; Lynne L.
Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 35, 51-59
(Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) [hereinafter Dallas, New Paradigm]; D.J. Hickson et al.,
Organization as Power, 3 RES. ORG. BEHAv. 151, 152-57 (1981); David Jacobs, Depend-
ency and Vulnerability: An Exchange Approach to the Control of Organizations, 19 ADMIN.
Sci. Q. 45, 49 (1974). See generally RONALD S. BURT, CORPORATE PROFITS AND Co-
OPTATION (1983); RICHARD M. CYERT & JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAvIORAL THEORY OF THE
FIRM (1963); HENRY MINTZBERG, POWER IN AND AROUND ORGANIZATIONS (1983);
CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY (3d ed. 1986); JEFFREY
PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANciK, THE EXTERNAL CONTROL OF ORGANIZATIONS: A
RESOURCE DEPENDENCE PERSPECTIVE (1978); JEFFREY PFEFFER, ORGANIZATIONS AND
ORGANIZATION THEORY (1982); W. RICHARD SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATU-
RAL AND OPEN SYSTEMS (1981); W. RICHARD SCOTT ET AL., ORGANIZATION THEORY: A
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ness literature, but has been largely ignored by legal reformers. Whereas
conflicts monitoring theories perceive the board as mediating conflicts
between managers and shareholders, power coalition theory describes the
board's roles in terms of the corporation's relationships with various
corporate stakeholders (including shareholders) and the corporation's social
environment.
Under power coalition theory, the board provides the corporation with
relational resources that decrease the corporation's uncertainty and enhance
its chances of survival.6 These resources include coordination with the
external environment, information access and exchange, support of corpo-
rate business, advice on various subjects, legitimacy and status in the eyes
of relevant communities, monitoring, and control. Under this theory,
functions of boards in addition to conflicts monitoring are economically
significant. Independent directors, however, may not always be in a
position to provide all of these resources. Provision of these resources
often depends on a mix of inside and nonindependent outside directors
serving on boards.
This analysis suggests that a board ideally composed to engage in
conflicts monitoring - containing only independent directors - is not the
same board best able to perform many other relational roles. The reverse
is also true. A board ideally composed to perform many other relational
roles is not the best board for dealing with the monitoring of conflicts of
interest situations. Three possibilities are suggested by this analysis. First,
the board can be limited to performing one set of functions, such as con-
flicts monitoring. Corporate law reformers theoretically lean in this direc-
tion by focusing mainly on the importance of conflicts monitoring. A
leading scholar, for example, claims that conflicts monitoring is the most
important function of the board and the only function for which the board
is uniquely suited.7
Another possibility is for the board to perform all functions but to
recognize the compromises made in achieving fully effective performance
of any one set of functions. This is the current state of affairs. In response
to the board reform debate, corporations have added more independent
directors to their boards to perform conflicts monitoring, but also have
inside and nonindependent outside directors on their boards. The problem
STRUCTURAL AND BEHAvIORAL ANALYSIS (1981); JAMES D. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATIONS
IN AcnON (1967); DJ. Hickson et al., A Strategic Contingencies' Theory of Intraorganiza-
tional Power, 16 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 216 (1971).
6. See infra Part I.B (discussing power coalition theory of boards).
7. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 169-70.
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with this solution is that a board so constructed is neither wholly suited to
engage in conflicts monitoring nor to perform many other relational func-
tions.
A third possibility exists that would permit all functions to be per-
formed as effectively as possible. Corporations could establish a dual board
structure with one board ideally suited for conflicts monitoring and the
other board suited to perform other relational functions. Such a board
structure is presented and analyzed in this Article.
I will also explain in this Article how the proposed.dual board struc-
ture is fundamentally different from foreign two-board systems, such as the
well-known German two-tiered board structure' and the less well-known
two-board structure in Japan.' These systems operate in similar ways to
8. THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT §§ 76-171 (Hannes Schneider & Martin
Heidenhain trans., 1996); see EDWARD ARETz, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW 99-105 (1993);
JONATHAN P. CHARKHAm, KEEPING GOOD COMPANY 17-25 (1994); ADRIAAN DORREsTEuN
ET AL., EUROPEAN CORPORATE LAW 112-14 (1994); JULIAN MAITLAND-WALKER, GUIDE
TO EUROPEAN COMPANY LAws 163-66 (1993); Alfred F. Conard, The Supervision of
Corporate Management: A Comparison of Developments in European Community and United
States Law, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1459, 1465-70 (1984); Klaus J. Hopt, New Ways in Corpo-
rate Governance: European Experiments with Labor Representation on Corporate Boards,
82 MICH. L. REv. 1338, 1344-48 (1984); Christian J. Meier-Schatz, Corporate Governance
and Legal Rules: A Transnational Look at Concepts and Problems of Internal Management
Control, 13 J. CORP. L. 431, 443-44 (1988); Dirk Schmalenbach, Federal Republic of
Germany, in INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 109, 110 (Joseph F. Lufkin &
David Gallagher eds., 1990); J. Bautz Bonanno, Note, Employee Codetermination: Origins
in Germany, Present Practices in Europe, and Applicability to the United States, 14 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 947, 952 n.10 (1977); Benjamin T. Lo, Note, Improving Corporate Gover-
nance: Lessons from the European Community, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 219, 239-46
(1993).
9. Act Regarding Exceptional Rules of the Commercial Code Concerning Auditing,
Etc., of Stock Corporations, Law No. 22 of 1974 (Japan), as amended, reprinted in 2 JAPAN
Bus. L. J. 443 (H. Nakatsu trans., 1981); The Commercial Code, Law No. 48 of 1899
(Japan), as amended (Zentaro Kitagawa trans., 1994); see CHARKHAm, supra note 8, at 85-
93; YUKIO YANAGIDA ET AL., LAW AND INVESTMENT IN JAPAN: CASES AND MATERIALS
274-79 (1994); Survey, Corporate Governance in Japan: The Position of Shareholders in
Publicly Held Corporations, 5 U. HAW. L. REV. 135, 153-61 (1983); Commercial Code of
Japan Amended, WORLD ACCT. REP., Aug. 1993, at 6 [hereinafter Commercial Code
Amended]; Dawning: Japanese Corporate Governance, ECONOMIST, May 22, 1993, at 87,
88 [hereinafter Dawning]; New Audit Powers Aim to Prevent "Bubble," WORLD ACCT.
REP., Apr. 1993, at 8, 9 [hereinafter New Audit Powers]; Asako Ishibashi, Firms Brace for
New Breed of Shareholder: Foreign Investors, New Laws Spell End to Rubber-Stamps,
NIKKEI WKLY., June 27, 1994, at 1; Yo Makino, Firms to Hire Outside Auditors, Directors:
Commercial Law Brings Groundbreaking Changes Designed to Make Corporations More
Open, N= WKLY., June 14, 1993, at 3; Marlene Givant Star, Japanese Mull Shareholder
Rights Reform, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS, May 17, 1993, at 3.
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unitary boards except that management is placed on a separate board. The
objective of the unitary and two-tiered board structures is to separate super-
vision from management. All nonmanagement functions are performed by
the same board. In contrast, the dual board structure requires the assign-
ment of nonmanagement functions to two separate boards that are ideally
composed to perform these functions.
Because corporate boards perform a number of different kinds of rela-
tional (including supervisory) roles, it appears that separating supervision
from management is only the first step in thinking about appropriate board
structures. The dual board structure attempts to take the next step. It
assigns to the conflicts board supervisory authority over such matters as the
hiring and firing of executive officers, the corporation's response to tender
offers, and changes in accounting principles and practices, i.e., conflicts
monitoring functions. These issues pose serious conflicts for managers and
are, therefore, best decided by a board composed solely of independent
directors. Some other relational resources, such as advice and status, may
also be provided by the independent directors on the conflicts board. The
business review board is assigned other supervisory functions such as
reviewing the corporation's major business plans and objectives. The busi-
ness review board would also perform other relational roles such as coordi-
nation or information access and exchange. These relational roles would
be facilitated by the business review board's membership, which would
include persons, such as suppliers and creditors, having business relation-
ships with the corporation.
In Part I of this Article, I will present the theoretical framework for
the dual board proposal. This Part will explore relational roles of boards,
explained by power coalition theory, and the psychology of board decision'
making. This Part will also examine empirical evidence on board composi-
tion that demonstrates the importance of independent directors to effective
conflicts monitoring. In Part II, I will describe and analyze the dual board
proposal in depth, giving attention to the qualifications of board members,
the functions of the two boards, and methods for resolving conflicts be-
tween them. In Part I, I will discuss my proposal for a board ombuds-
person, specifying proposed qualifications, functions, and other require-
ments. This proposed ombudsperson differs in significant respects from
existing corporate ombudspersons that are currently employed by a number
of U.S. corporations. I will comment upon these differences and similari-
ties. Finally, in Part IV, I will investigate different kinds of two-board
systems. I will compare the two-boards system in Germany and Japan with
each other, with unitary boards, and with the dual board proposed by this
Article.
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L The Underpinnings of the Dual Board Proposal
The dual board proposal rests on two premises: (a) that the board
performs a variety of important relational roles and (b) that board independ-
ence is important to one of these relational roles, namely, conflicts monitor-
ig. In the following two sections, I will explore conflicts monitoring and
relational (power coalition) theories of corporate boards. Following this
discussion, I will examine psychological and empirical literature that
demonstrates the importance of independence to conflicts monitoring.
A. Conflicts Monitoring by Boards
The corporate reform debate has centered on hegemony and agency
cost theories, which I briefly describe in this section. Hegemony theorists
view the board as being dominated by management and, therefore, as
ineffective in performing conflicts monitoring.1" According to hegemony
theorists, the solution is to decrease managerial domination by adopting
structural rules that assure directoral independence from management.
Attention is given to such factors as the process of selecting directors, the
characteristics of the directors themselves - whether they are independent
or nonindependent directors, time constraints on directors, and the availabil-
ity of information and other resources to enable the board to monitor
effectively."
The 1982 draft of the American Law Institute's (ALI) project on
corporate governance, the Principles of Corporate Governance,12 reflected
the influence of hegemony theory. This draft required large public corpora-
tions to have a majority of independent directors on their boards. 3 As I
explain later in this Article, this draft did not go far enough in proposing
a board that would effectively perform conflicts monitoring - a board
composed solely of independent directors. Nevertheless, by 1984, the ALI
reduced this provision from a mandatory provision to a recommendation,
14
10. E.g., Dallas, supra note 2, at 4-8; Kosnik, supra note 2, at 166-67; Lin, supra
note 2, at 912-17; Mallette & Fowler, supra note 2, at 1014; Zahra & Pearce, supra note
3, at 295-96.
11. EisENBERG, supra note 1, at 170-72; MoNKS &MNow, supra note 1, at 178-229;
Kosnik, supra note 2, at 167; Lin, supra note 2, at 913-17; Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note
1, at 245-47.
12. Tentative Draft No. 1, supra note 1, § 3.03(a).
13. Id.
14. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRmCILES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.04 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1984) [hereinafter Tentative Draft
No. 2].
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and the provision was fortunate to survive in recommendation form in the
final draft of the Principles of Corporate Governance in 1994.15 This
change was due mainly to the opposition of another conflicts monitoring
theory, agency cost theory. 6
While agency cost theory, like hegemony theory, focuses on conflicts
monitoring by boards of directors, agency cost theory does not support
legislative reforms because it relies on evolutionary market theory.'
7
According to evolutionary market theory, it is through markets and not law-
making that efficient governance structures can be achieved. Mandatory
changes in board composition and structure that apply uniformly to a large
group of corporations, such as those proposed by the 1984 ALI draft,
would interfere with natural market evolution. Because I am not advocating
mandating the changes I propose in this Article, I need not address these
arguments.' 8 Agency cost theory, however, needs to be explained because
it has been important in influencing thinking about boards. Agency cost
theory offers an explanation of when and how boards perform conflicts
monitoring functions. 9
Under agency cost theory, a board will perform conflicts monitoring
when the performance of such functions by the board is the least costly
method for the corporation to reduce agency costs." Agency costs are the
costs borne by shareholders (principals) when managers (agents) act in their
personal interest rather than in the interests of shareholders.2' Examples of
15. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, § 3A.01.
16. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate Governance
Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1047-52 (1993).
17. Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, Corporate Governance and the Board of
Directors: Performance Effects of Changes in Board Composition, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
101, 102 (1985) [hereinafter Baysinger & Butler, Corporate Governance]; Barry D. Bay-
singer & Henry N. Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution in Corporation Law: The ALI's
Project and the Independent Director, 52 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 557, 562-68 (1984) [herein-
after Baysinger & Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution]; Fama, supra note 3, at 292-306;
Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, supra note 3, at 313-15.
18. I critique these arguments elsewhere. See Dallas, New Paradigm, supra note 5,
at 38-46; Dallas, Two Models, supra note 5, at 46-48.
19. For a more detailed description of this theory, see Dallas, supra note 2, at 8-10.
20. This is often referred to as the substitute hypothesis which predicts that least cost
methods for reducing agency costs will be substituted for more costly methods. See
Chenchuramaiah T. Bathala & Ramesh P. Rao, The Determinants of Board Composition:
An Agency Theory Perspective, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 59, 59-60 (1995);
James A. Brickley & Christopher M. James, The Takeover Market, Corporate Board
Composition, and Ownership Structure: The Case of Banking, 30 J.L. & ECON. 161, 162-63
(1987).
21. .ARRYE. RmsEiN&PEm V. Lrou, BusINEssAssOCIATlONs 4 (3d ed. 1996);
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methods that substitute for the conflicts monitoring functions of the board
are high corporate leverage that decreases managerial discretion,' stock
ownership by managers that aligns the interests of shareholders and man-
agers,23 and high dividend payouts that require managers to return to the
discipline of capital markets to finance additional corporate investments. 2
Thus, boards will perform conflicts monitoring when it is the most cost-
effective mechanism for reducing agency costs as determined by competi-
tion with other ways for reducing agency costs. According to agency cost
theory, when the board performs conflicts monitoring, it does so by using
outside board members to act as "arbiters" among top corporate executives
who compete for the chief executive officer's (CEO) position.' The
board's function is to serve as a "top-level court of appeals of the internal
agent [labor] market. "I While agency cost literature makes reference to the
importance of inside director expertise and the support that outside directors
can provide to managers,27 the theory centers on the importance of using
outsider directors to monitor managerial performance. Like hegemony
theory, agency cost theory is basically a theory about conflicts monitoring.
The U.S. debate on board reform has been influenced by these con-
flicts monitoring theories. Certainly, the tender offer phenomena of the
1970s and 80s justified enhanced attention to the management-shareholder
relationship and how corporate boards serve shareholders when managerial
interests conflict with those of shareholders. However, boards perform
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3, at 308-10.
22. See Bathala & Rao, supra note 20, at 62. But see Pearce & Zahra, supra note 2,
at 421, 430 (finding positive association between increased leverage and boards with higher
proportions of outside directors, which presumably makes boards more likely to monitor);
ieffrey Pfeffer, Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors: The Organization
and Its Environment, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 218, 222-27 (1972) (finding positive correlation
between proportion of outside directors on corporate boards and debt-to-equity ratios).
23. See Bathala & Rao, supra note 20, at 61-62. But see Benjamin E. Hermalin &
Michael S. Weisbach, The Determinants of Board Composition, 19 RAND J. ECON. 589, 594
(1988) (finding no relationship between extent of top management shareholdings and fraction
of outside directors when management family members on board are taken out of consider-
ation).
1 24. See Bathala & Rao, supra note 20, at 62. But see Michael H. Schellenger et
al., Board of Director Composition, Shareholder Wealth, and Dividend Policy, 15 J.
MGMT. 457, 465-66 (1989) (finding no support for hypothesis that inclusion of outside
directors in board composition and dividend policy serve as substitute agency monitoring
mechanisms).
25. Fama & Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, supra note 3, at 315.
26. Id. at 314.
27. Id.
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much broader functions that serve a wider group of stakeholders and go
beyond monitoring. This Article is premised on the belief that the broader
relational functions of the board should be taken into account in board
reform if reform is to result in truly effective boards. The power coalition
(relational) theory is discussed in the next section of this Article.
B. Relational Roles of Boards
The power coalition theory is widely accepted by sociologists and
organizational behaviorists,'S but has been largely ignored by legal academi-
cians. Under this theory, coalitions or stakeholders, such as employees,
suppliers, and shareholders, interact in a political, economic, and social
environment to determine corporate behavior. Control over corporate
decision making is determined by the corporation's dependence on various
physical resources provided by these coalitions and contextual resources. 29
Coalitions attempt to become part of the dominant coalition (which gener-
ally also includes top management)' to control decision making with re-
spect to certain aspects of the corporation's business. The dominant coali-
tion with respect to particular actions becomes, for the actions it deter-
mines, the corporation.3
28. See generally supra note 5 and accompanying text.
29. See Dallas, New Paradigm, supra note 5, at 53-54 (stating that corporate "behavior
can be explained by treating the institutional and social environment of the corporation as
contextual resources or influences"); see also Steven Brint & Jerome Karabel, Institutional
Origins and Transformations: The Case of American Community Colleges, in THE NEW
INSTITLOJT NSM IN ORGANizATIONAL ANALYSiS 337, 359 n.15 (Walter W. Powell & Paul
J. DiMaggio eds., 1991).
30. Dallas, Two Models, supra note 5, at 31.
31. See Dallas, New Paradigm, supra note 5, at 52. In that Article, I stated:
To some degree the concept of the dominant coalition resolves the difficulty of
reifying the corporation or defining its goals as the aggregation of individual
goals. Individual and group goals are not aggregated, because individuals and
groups do not necessarily resolve their conflicts or agree to common goals....
[C]orporations often pursue inconsistent goals. In addition, while corporate goals
derive from individual and group goals, no one individual or group is usually
powerful enough to impose its goals on the corporation. Through corporate
processes, corporate goals emerge that satisfy the parties or coalitions comprising
the dominant coalition; these goals are distinct from the goals of any one individ-
ual or group. Furthermore, goals result from the communication among individ-
uals and groups concerning opportunities and dangers presented by or to the
organizational structure itself. Organizational theorists have observed that in this
respect the dominant coalition can be said to have a unified goal, which is to
increase the discretion of the organizational structure and decrease the uncertainty
confronting it.
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The corporation so construed tends to use boards to secure various
resources to decrease the corporation's uncertainties and to increase the
corporation's chances of survival. 32 Board memberships are used as a
"bridging." strategy to link the corporation to various stakeholders and
generally to its social environment.33 Board memberships fall somewhere
between other linking strategies, namely, contract and merger, which have
different integrative qualities.34
Board members provide various resources to the corporation. These
resources include (a) coordination with its external environment, (b) infor-
mation access and exchange, (c) support through identification with the
corporation, (d) status within the community, (e) legitimacy in the eyes of
relevant audiences, (f) advice based on the background and skills of direc-
tors, (g) monitoring, and (h) control.35 The corporation, for example, may
have representatives of its creditors and suppliers on its board. These rela-
tionships may improve coordination, further information access and ex-
change, supply advice, and create support for the corporation. The corpo-
ration may also have a banker on the board, which may send a signal of
solvency to corporations that do business with the corporation.36 Lawyers,
investment bankers, sports figures, environmentalists, and women on boards
may also serve the corporation by furnishing it with advice, information,
support, status, and legitimacy in the eyes of relevant audiences. Finally,
Id.; see also ScoTr Er AL., supra note 5, at 265-66. Professor Mintzberg states: "To the
extent that there is some consistency in the intentions behind the decisions and actions taken
by [the corporation's] participants ... the organization as a system can be said to pursue
a certain outcome consistently." MuINZBERG, supra note 5, at 246.
32. See Dallas, supra note 2, at 10; Pearce & Zahra, supra note 2, at 415-34 (refer-
ring to strategic contingency perspective); see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
33. See supra note 32. For an analysis of empirical support for the power coalition
theory of boards, see Dallas, supra note 2, at 16-18. The power coalition theory predicts
"a positive relationship between the level of environmental uncertainty and the number
of more relational (or outside) directors on boards; a positive relationship between ex-
ternal resource needs and board memberships; and a positive relationship between the use
of board memberships to deal with resource dependencies and corresponding measures of
corporate effectiveness." Dallas, supra note 2, at 16. For related empirical studies
generally, see Pearce & Zahra, supra note 2; Pfeffer, supra note 22; Keith G. Rovan, Board
Power and Organizational Effectiveness Among Human Service Agencies, 23 AcAD. MGmT.
J. 221 (1980); Zahra & Pearce, supra note 3; and Mayer N. Zald, Urban Differentiation,
Characritics of Boards of Directors, and Organizational Effectiveness, 73 AM. J. Soc. 261
(1967).
34. For a detailed discussion of this topic generally, see Dallas, Two Models, supra
note 5.
35. Id.; see also MINrZBERG, supra note 5, at 67-95.
36. Pearce & Zahra, supra note 2, at 415.
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inside directors may perform relational roles as representatives of coalitions
or groups of diverse interests found within the corporate organization itself.
Power coalition theory also explains the relational role of protecting
shareholders from managerial self-dealing.' 7 This conflicts monitoring may
occur through shareholder representatives on the board. Shareholder
representatives are enabled to monitor managers because of the corpora-
tion's dependence on capital resources and because of the corporation's
dependence on shareholder democracy for the legitimacy of its governance
structure. For example, closely held corporations are mainly dependent on
shareholders for capital resources and expertise. The publicly held corpora-
tion depends less on the shareholders' provision of capital and expertise
than on the legitimacy provided to the corporation's governance structure
by shareholder participation.38 Conflicts monitoring on behalf of sharehold-
ers is a relational function that is understood by using the same general
theory that explains the performance of other relational functions by the
board.
Normatively, corporate reform proposals that ignore the many rela-
tional roles of the board undermine the potential effectiveness of boards of
directors. 39 Board memberships may enhance the status of the corporation,
legitimize its operation, and may be the most cost-effective way to achieve
these objectives. For example, an environmentalist, employee, or woman
on the board may convey a serious commitment to the concerns of groups
that these members represent. Alternative arrangements such as advertise-
ments or management programs addressing specific concerns may not
demonstrate the same level of corporate sincerity as membership on the top
decision-making body of the corporation.
The board also provides a flexible forum for the exchange of informa-
tion and the provision of advice. Despite protestations to the contrary,'
these informational and advisory functions cannot be provided as effectively
by contract. Because it is not always known in advance whose information
or advice will be most useful, the deliberation of the board as a body is
valuable in assisting the corporation in confronting the issues it faces. The
board is composed of persons with different backgrounds and expertise who
can draw on relevant knowledge as the need arises. Another advantage of
relational roles performed by board members is legal context. Board mem-
bers who provide such resources as coordination, information, or advice
37. Dallas, Two Models, supra note 5, at 91-97.
38. Id. at 94-95.
39. Dallas, supra note 2, at 12-13.
40. EISENBERG, supra note 1, at 157-58.
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owe broad fiduciary obligations to act in the best interests of the corpora-
tion.41
In addition, the corporation may not be able to acquire various re-
sources, such as advice from fellow CEOs, except by offering board mem-
berships to them. It is traditionally accepted for CEOs to be on the boards
of other corporations, but not to enter into individual consulting contracts
with them. Also, CEOs are not motivated by monetary compensation to
serve on boards, but by the status, prestige, and experience that are unique
to board memberships. 42
In conclusion, board reform proposals that fail to take into account the
many relational roles of the board fail to recognize a variety of significant
contributions made by board members. Many of these roles are just as
important to the corporation as the monitoring of conflicts between manag-
ers and shareholders. They serve the best interests of the corporation.
Some relational roles are most effectively performed by a mix of different
kinds of directors, namely, inside directors and independent and noninde-
pendent outside directors.
C. Social Dynamics That Limit Outside Board
Members' Independence
Not only should board reform take into account the broader relational
roles of the board, it should recognize fully the impact of social influences on
so-called independent directors serving on boards also composed of inside
directors and nonindependent outside directors. This requires an under-
standing of the social psychology of groups. Because the two-process theory
of influence has been widely accepted in social psychology and has substan-
41. /n re Time Warner Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993); Joy v. North,
692 F.2d 880, 889 (2d Cir. 1982); Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 241 P.2d
66, 74 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952); Unitrin, Inc. v. American Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1373 (Del. 1995); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
42-45 (Del. 1994); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d. 1140, 1154-
55 (Del. 1989); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 404 (Del. 1987); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179-80 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858, 872 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983);
Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 306-07 (Del. Ch. 1994); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg.
Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. Ch. 1963); Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 166
N.E.2d 793, 799-80 (I1. 1960); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 821-22 (N.J.
1981).
42. E.g., JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE
REALITY OF AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 26-30 (1989).
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tial evidence to support it,' this section will explore this theory. The two
influence processes, normative and informational,' are discussed generally
in the following two subsections and are followed by an analysis of the
relationship of these influence processes to decision making by corporate
boards of directors. This analysis will demonstrate the importance of having
a board composed solely of independent directors for conflicts monitoring.
1. Normative Influences Affecting Confonnity in Groups
The traditional description of normative influences focuses on a power
process whereby group members seek to please others in the group in order
to obtain rewards and avoid punishment.45 "Compliance" or outward
conformity results, which does not necessarily affect the private beliefs of
group members.' This description of normative influences views confor-
mity as mainly tactical and instrumental - to obtain a reward or avoid pun-
ishment - rather than irrational and emotional.47 Impression management
and self-presentation theorists also maintain that compliance (or outward
conformity) is manipulative.' The manipulation results from a member's
attempts to control, through his compliance, the perceptions held of him by
others in the group. To many, this form of conformity adequately de-
scribes the group dynamic process. However, as the following discussion
reveals, group dynamics are much more complex.
Normative influences, for example, also result from the process of
identification.49 This is a process resulting from the attraction that a group
member feels for other members of the group. The member is induced to
adopt the values, ideas, and opinions of others in the group while he is part
of the group. Unlike compliance, private beliefs are affected so that public
conformity is congruent with private attitude changes. Under this theory,
it is the desire to be similar, rather than the other members' power over
43. See JOHN C. TURNER, SOCIAL INFLUENCE 37-47 (1991).
44. See ROBERT S. BARON ET AL., GROUP PROCESS, GROUP DECISION, GROUP ACTION
63, 67 (1992); DAvID 0. SEARS Er AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 241-44 (7th ed. 1991); ELIOT
R. SMrrH & DIANE M. MACKIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 361, 364 (1995); TURNER, supra note
43, at 34-39.
45. BARON ET AL., supra note 44, at 63; TURNER, supra note 43, at 34-35, 37-38.
46. BARON FT AL., supra note 44, at 67; SMITH & MACKIE, supra note 44, at 357;
TURNER, supra note 43, at 37.
47. TURNER, supra note 43, at 38.
48. Id. at 124.
49. Id. at 38-39, 117-18; see Herbert C. Kelman, Compliance, Identification, and
Internalization: Three Processes of Attitude Change, 2 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 51, 53 (1958).
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rewards or punishments, that motivates conformity.' According to impres-
sion management theory, a member may also seek to construct his or her
public self or identity to reflect an ideal public image." This image may
be responsive to demands of other board members or to an audience outside
the boardroom, in which case conformity to the demands of other board
members may be diminished or enhanced.
In summary, conformity pressures in groups result from normative
influences because group members seek to obtain rewards and avoid punish-
ment, to identify with attractive others, and to construct an ideal public
image. As we shall see below, these influences often reduce the independ-
ence of so-called independent directors in a group composed of inside
directors and nonindependent outside directors.
2. Informational Influences Affecting Conformity in Groups
Informational influences' occur when members of a group are depend-
ent on other group members for information. Conformity arises from the
need for information, although the cause of this dependence on others for
information is disputed. Social comparison theorists argue that dependence
on others for information arises when members experience uncertainty in
confronting a complex and ambiguous reality.53 Genetic theorists maintain
that it is not the ambiguity of the world but disagreement among individu-
als, or social conflict, that creates uncertainty.54 Genetic theorists support
their position with studies that show that subjects experience uncertainty
when other group members express disagreement about unambiguous
perceptual evidence.' Both theories are probably correct to some degree;
a member's confidence may be lessened (or uncertainties created) by
environmental factors, both physical and social, thereby making the member
susceptible to the informational influence of others.
Informational influences may affect individual, cognitive, and non-
normative thinking (persuasion argument theory) or thinking in which group
conformity or social processes play an important role (social comparison or
self-categorization theories). Social comparison theory56 argues that in am-
50. TURNER, supra note 43, at 117-18.
51. Id. at 124-28.
52. BARONETAL., supra note 44, at 67; SEARS ET AL., supra note 44, at 241; SMrrH
& MACKIE, supra note 44, at 361; TURNER, supra note 43, at 37.
53. SEARS ET AL., supra note 44, at 251-52; TURNER, supra note 43, at 26, 29-30, 37.
54. TURNER, supra note 43, at 84-86.
55. Id. at 84.
56. BARON ET AL., supra note 44, at 61-62; SMITH & MACKIE, supra note 44, at 361;
TURNER, supra note 43, at 25-29, 50.
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biguous situations group members determine what is correct, appropriate,
or desirable by comparing their beliefs with others in the group who have
similar attributes and who are deemed expert, trustworthy, and credible.
This comparison process results in the development of shared social norms.
The member's private beliefs are modified, and the resulting changes persist
beyond the time of membership in the group.'
Arguably, findings that groups tend to polarize or move toward a
position that is more extreme than the average aggregate views of group
members present a challenge to the social comparison theory." With social
comparisons, one can expect that individual members will converge on an
average position as a result of their interpersonal comparisons. One expla-
nation of this phenomena consistent with social comparison theory is that
only when members hear the extreme views of others in a group will they
acknowledge their preference for that more valued, extreme position. 9
Prior to group discussion, members assume that others do not share these
more extreme views and, therefore, do not express them.
Persuasion argument theory, which relies on individual, cognitive
thinking rather than social processes, provides another explanation for the
polarization phenomena. 6 Persuasion argument theory explains that groups
tend to move toward a more extreme position because more arguments
favor that position. Prior to group discussion, a member is likely to be
aware of only a few arguments supporting his position. Exposure to addi-
tional novel arguments by others who agree with the member results in
group movement to the more extreme position. This theory, however, has
weak empirical support.6 Evidence shows that mere exposure to the
positions of other group members in the absence of argument is sufficient
to result in polarization.62 In addition, polarization takes place when
persuasive arguments are not meaningful.6' Arguments against the extreme
position would also appear to be more novel to members who support the
extreme position than arguments in favor of it.'
57. See TURNER, supra note 43, at 37-38.
58. BARON ET AL., supra note 44, at 73; SMrrH & MACKIE, supra note 44, at 372-76;
TURNER, supra note 43, at 48.
59. See TURNER, supra note 43, at 54-58.
60. JOHN SABINI, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 37 (2d ed. 1995); TURNER, supra note 43, at
64-71.
61. TURNER, supra note 43, at 61-63, 71.
62. Id. at 62-63.
63. Id. at 71.
64. Id. at 72-74.
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In addition, the more recent self-categorization theory explains the
polarization phenomena in terms of social processes.' Like social compari-
son theory, self-categorization theory sees members as moving toward a con-
sensual position of the group based on interpersonal comparisons. However,
this theory does not see this position as an average of group members' opin-
ions. Members move toward a "prototypical" group position that reflects not
only intragroup comparisons but also comparisons of the group position with
relevant out-groups (i.e., intergroup comparisons). This explanation grounds
informational influence on a shared group identification process.
It appears from the above discussion that judgments made by groups
will be informationally influenced in some way by the views held by other
members of the group and group norms. As the next subsection will show,
this social process can reduce the independence of so-called independent
directors in a group composed of inside directors and nonindependent outside
directors.
Before proceeding with the next subsection, however, it should be
acknowledged that an argument can be made that the two-process theory of
influence is mistaken and that there is in reality only one process.67 Norma-
tive and informational influences are certainly related to one another. Social
norms convey information. 68 Moreover, information is validated by refer-
ence to existing social norms. 69 Despite this argument, however, the motiva-
tions of members that result in normative and informational influences differ.
Normative influences operate because the member desires to obtain rewards
or avoid punishment, seeks to identify with the group, or attempts to con-
struct a public identity approximating some public ideal. Informational
influences stem from a member's desire to be right7° when uncertainty arises
due to a complex, ambiguous external reality or disagreement within the
group. Of course, the determination of what is right and what information
is relevant involves normative judgments.
3. Normative and Informational Influences on Corporate Boards
Substantial evidence supports the relationship between conformity and
normative and informational influences. 71 Research has identified group and
65. Id. at 76-78.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 38-39, 46.
68. Id. at 47.
69. BARON ET AL., supra note 44, at 77; TURNER, supra note 43, at 47.
70. TURNER, supra note 43, at 35, 37.
71. See id. at 40-47.
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task characteristics that tend to decrease the independence of group members.
Some of these characteristics are discussed below in the context of corporate
boards.
According to the process of normative influence, compliance is expected
when a group member depends on other group members to receive valuable
rewards and to avoid costs. Therefore, a member is more likely to conform
to the group when the group controls valuable consequences. Corporate
boards are groups characterized by their ability to provide valuable benefits
to their members. Board members rely on other board members for benefits,
such as the prestige that comes from being chosen as a board member,'
business experience acquired from board membership,' and financial com-
pensation for service on the board. The continuation of a member on the
board depends in most cases on the opinion of other board members, particu-
larly those on the board's nomination committee.
The degree of attraction a member feels toward other group members
is also an important characteristic of groups.74 Substantial evidence sup-
ports the importance of attraction to conformity. 15 From a normative per-
spective, the attraction of group members increases both the member's
identification with other group members and the cost to the member of
rejection.7 6 Informationally, attraction increases the credibility of other
group members. 77
Attraction among members characterizes corporate boards. Recent
studies have found that board members are primarily motivated to serve on
boards because of the identity of other board members, rather than the
financial condition of the corporation or the belief that they can make valu-
able contributions to the corporation.78 Thus, it is the attractiveness of other
board members that is most important to board members in accepting board
positions.
Another factor that contributes to conformity is the ambiguity or com-
plexity of the task to be performed by the group.79 Informational influences
are based on uncertainty produced by ambiguity and complexity. Solid evi-
72. James D. Cox & Harry C. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological
Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1985, at 83, 96-97.
73. LoRSCH & MACIVER, supra note 42, at 23-30.
74. SABINI, supra note 60, at 77; TURNER, supra note 43, at 40-42.
75. BARON ET AL., supra note 44, at 66, 75; TURNER, supra note 43, at 21, 40-42.
76. TURNER, supra note 43, at 121.
77. Id.
78. KORN/FERRY INT'L, 22ND ANNUAL BOARD OF DIRECTORS STUDY 31 (1995).
79. BARON Er AL., supra note 44, at 66, 75; TURNER, supra note 43, at 25, 44-45.
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dence supports the importance of this task characteristic to conformity.'
Corporate boards of directors usually are confronted with ambiguous and
complex data on which their actions are based. Indeed, courts have recog-
nized difficulties associated with making the kinds of judgments required
of boards and have consequently adopted a deferential standard for review-
ing challenged board decisions.81
The public surveillance of member behavior by the group also contrib-
utes to conformity. Less conformity occurs when members may act anony-
mously."m On corporate boards, member behavior is publicly observable by
other members of the board, thus contributing to conformity pressures.
Certain factors may, to some degree, lessen conformity pressures on
corporate boards. Although members need to coordinate their behavior to
achieve group goals, the degree of coordination required (i.e., attaining a
majority consensus) is not intricate or finely tuned. Also, group goals are
not always clear and thus weaken group cohesion.' Moreover, board
members are high-status, knowledgeable persons' 4 whose needs for approval
and information may be less than others in the general population. Never-
theless, what seems more important to group conformity than some absolute
measure of status is that, on-a comparative basis, some board members will
be perceived as more able than others.'
The higher-status members on corporate boards will in most cases
consist of the CEO, who often also serves as the chairperson of the board,
and other inside directors who have high-level positions in the corporate
hierarchy. Unfortunately, these members are also more likely to have
80. TURNER, supra note 43, at 44-45.
81. Reference is made to the business judgment rule, which is a "presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company." Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Dierdre A. Burgman & Paul N. Cox, Corporate
Directors, Corporate Realities and Deliberative Process: An Analysis of the Trans Union
Case, 11 J. CORP. L. 311, 329 (1986); Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The
Business of Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAw. 1187, 1188 (1986); Bayless Man-
ning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty of Attention: Time For Reality,
39 Bus. LAW. 1477, 1490-91 (1984).
82. BARON ET AL., supra note 44, at 66; SMITH & MAcKiE, supra note 44, at 366;
TURNER, supra note 43, at 35-36, 44. Another factor that may contribute to conformity is
the directors' interest in nonmonetary rewards. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 72, at 99;
see LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 42, at 23-30.
83. TURNER, supra note 43, at 22; see LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 42, at 170.
84. TURNER, supra note 43, at 45, 66; see SEARS ET AL., supra note 44, at 257-60.
85. TURNER, supra note 43, at 45-46.
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conflicts on matters considered by the board. The literature shows clear
evidence of "a correlation between the capacity to exert influence and one's
position in a hierarchical social structure."I Studies of conformity produc-
ing harsh results through members' compliance with legitimate (not equated
to legal) authority permeate the literature.' Breaches of ethics often result
when a member is in the "agentic state" or has ceded "control to the repre-
sentative of established institutions, norms and reference groups [where]
legitimate authority substitutes for the [member's] own self-regulation. "I
Levels of conformity below the agentic state are just as problematic when
a board must decide issues that present serious conflicts of interest for some
of its members.
Despite the great deal of attention given to board independence since
the 1970s, a recent study of corporate boards has identified board norms
that evidence substantial conformity pressures. 9 Jay W. Lorsch and Eliza-
beth MacIver, after extensive surveys and interviews of corporate board
members, identified the following board norms that indicate a lack of
directoral independence: (a) board members should not criticize the CEO,
especially in front of inside directors; (b) board members should not seek
information outside the communication channels provided by the CEO; and
(c) board members should not discuss issues of accountability or the pre-
mises on which the board operates.'
D. Empirical Studies on the Importance of Board
Independence to Conflicts Monitoring
A number of studies have attempted to determine the importance of
directoral independence to effective conflicts monitoring. These studies
have predicted a positive association between the proportion of outside
directors or so-called independent directors on boards to an overall measure
of corporate performance.9 1 The results of these studies have been mixed.
86. Id. at 131.
87. Id. at 136-41.
88. Id. at 140.
89. LORSCH & MACIVER, supra note 42, at 91-96, 170-71.
90. Id.
91. E.g., Baysinger & Butler, Corporate Governance, supra note 17, at 114-21;
Baysinger & Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution, supra note 17, at 572-76; Rajeswararao
S. Chaganti et aL, Corporate Board Size, Composition and Corporate Failures in Retailing
Industry, 22 J. MGMT. STUD. 406-07 (1985); William Q. Judge, Jr., Correlates of Organiza-
tional Effectiveness: A Multilevel Analysis of a Muldimensional Outcome, 13 J. Bus. ETHICS
1, 3-4 (1994); Pearce & Zahra, supra note 2, at 4-12-15; Stuart Rosenstein & Jeffrey G.
Wyatt, Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth, 26 J. FIN. ECON.
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One study found a positive lagged effect between the proportion of inde-
pendent directors on corporate boards and corporate financial perfor-
mance.' This study also found marginal declines in relative performance
for additional independent directors added to the board when the board was
already thirty percent independent. 3 Other studies have found negative or
no correlation between the proportion of outside or so-called independent
directors on corporate boards and corporate financial performance. 94
These studies on overall financial performance are poor measures of
the importance of board independence to conflicts monitoring. The studies
that consider the proportion of outside directors on boards do not exclude
from their measure of supposedly independent outside directors those direc-
tors who have substantial professional and other business relationships with
corporations. The studies also assume that directoral independence will
contribute to overall corporate performance because independence is impor-
tant to conflicts monitoring. However, some relational roles may best be
performed by nonindependent directors. With conflicts monitoring or other
relational roles more or less important to the corporation at different times,
it is difficult to assess the importance of conflicts monitoring by independ-
ent directors through the use of overall measures of corporate perfor-
mance.
95
Other empirical studies do a better job of measuring the importance of
board independence to conflicts monitoring by focusing narrowly on con-
flicts of interest issues addressed by boards.' These studies have found
positive correlations between the proportion of outside directors or so-called
independent directors on corporate boards and effective conflicts monitor-
ing. A number of studies of tender offers and going private transactions
that raise substantial shareholder-management conflicts found positive cor-
relations between the proportion of independent or outside directors on
175, 176, 190 (1990); Schellenger et al., supra note 24, at 457-59, 465. See generally
Dallas, supra note 2; Zahra & Pearce, supra note 3.
92. Baysinger & Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution, supra note 17, at 572-73.
93. Id. at 575.
94. E.g., Chaganti et al., supra note 91, at 411-12; Judge, supra note 91, at 7.
95. It is also important to acknowledge that these studies cannot be compared to draw
definitive conclusions because they use different databases, were developed to test distinct
hypotheses, and use different measurements of financial performance.
96. E.g., Kosnik, supra note 2, at 180-82; Paula L. Rechner et al., Corporate
Governance Predictors of Adoption of Anti-Takeover Amendments: An Empirical Analysis,
12 J. Bus. ETHICS 371, 374-75 (1993); Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO
Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 435-36 (1988); Chun I. Lee et al., Board Composition and
Shareholder Wealth: The Case of Management Buyouts, FIN. MGMT., Spring 1992, at 58,
61-63. See generally Dallas, supra note 2.
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corporate boards and positive measures of conflicts monitoring.' In
addition, an important study of CEO turnover that also considered financial
performance discovered that corporations were more likely to replace CEOs
when the corporations were performing poorly and had a board dominated
by outside directors.98 Although these studies do not test whether adding
more independent directors to corporate boards would improve conflicts
monitoring" and often do not exclude nonindependent outside directors
97. See Kosnik, supra note 2, at 179-80 (discovering greenmail payments were nega-
tively associated with proportion of outside directors on corporate boards). The Kosnik
study assumes that paying greenmail is harmful to shareholders, which may not always be
the case. E.g., Lin, supra note 2, at 933-34. Also, this study found that boards that re-
sisted paying greenmail had more outside directors with contractual links to the corporation
than boards that paid greenmail. Kosnik, supra note 2, at 179-80. Other kinds of outside
directors that it studied were directors with family or cross-directorate relationships with the
corporation's executives. Id. The study did not test the effect of having independent
directors on boards. To the extent that outside directors are more independent than inside
directors, it found a higher proportion of outside directors on boards that resisted paying
greenmail. Id.; see also Rechner et al., supra note 96, at 376 (finding positive relationship
between more inside directors on boards and corporations' use of antitakeover measures);
Lee et al., supra note 96, at 67-68 (finding more positive abnormal returns associated with
going private transaction announcement by corporations dominated by outside directors than
by other corporations). The Rechner study makes the controversial assumption that antitake-
over tactics are detrimental to shareholders. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 2, at 932-36.
Beneficial effects of antitakeover tactics may explain findings with respect to golden
parachutes. Id. at 935-36 (discussing studies finding positive relationship between corpora-
tions with golden parachutes and higher proportions of outside directors on their boards).
While the proportion of independent directors on boards may have little to do with the
probability that corporations will adopt poison pills, see Mallette & Fowler, supra note 2,
at 1023, 1029, a recent study found that the average stock market reaction to a corporation's
adoption of poison pills is positive when the corporation's board is composed predominantly
of independent directors and otherwise is negative. See generally James A. Brickley et al.,
Outside Directors and the Adoption of Poison Pills, 35 J. FIN. ECON. 371 (1994).
98. Weisbach, supra note 96, at 458-59; see also Omesh Kini et al., Corporate Take-
overs, Finn Performance, and Board Composition, 1 J. CoRP. FIN. 383, 410 (1995) (finding
no relationship between CEO turnover after takeover and corporate performance prior to
takeover when outside directors dominated board prior to takeover). Other studies that
arguably demonstrate the importance of board independence to effective monitoring of
managerial conflicts are studies involving executive compensation. See Brickley & James,
supra note 20, at 179 (finding that proportion of outside directors in banks in nonacquisition
states was negatively related to higher executive salaries); Hamid Mehran, Executive
Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm Performance, 38 J. FIN. ECON. 163, 179
(1995) (finding that corporations with higher proportion of outside directors made greater
use of equity-based compensation).
99. These studies do not test, however, whether conflicts monitoring would be best
performed by a board composed solely of independent directors. Two studies have found
that adding independent directors to the unitary board beyond some proportion of independ-
ent directors may adversely affect corporate performance. See supra text accompanying
note 92; see also John W. Byrd & Kent A. Hickman, Do Outside Directors Monitor
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from their measurements of independent directors, the studies nevertheless
provide considerable support for the general proposition that board inde-
pendence is important to conflicts monitoring.
I. The First Board Reform Proposal: The Dual Board
Corporate board reform should take into consideration the psychology
of group decision making. It should also recognize and seek to improve the
effectiveness of many relational roles that boards perform, including con-
flicts monitoring. At this juncture in the analysis, however, the corporate
board reformer finds herself on the horns of a dilemma. Making the board
independent will enhance its conflicts monitoring capabilities, but will de-
crease the ability of the board to perform other important relational func-
tions. The dilemma may be resolved by thinking in terms of a two-board
system. The dual board is such a system. Each board would be assigned
distinct functions that would be performed by directors whose characteris-
tics are matched to these functions. The conflicts board would consider
conflicts of interest issues and would be composed of independent directors.
The business review board would decide all other issues and would consist
of a mix of different kinds of directors. In the following sections, I will
discuss each of these boards in turn. I will discuss their membership
criteria and functions. I will also explore communications between the
boards, the resolution of conflicts between them, and possible concerns
about introducing dissension at the top decision-making level of the corpo-
ration through a dual board structure.
A. The Conflicts Board
1. Independent Directors
The conflicts board should be composed of directors that do not have
conflicts with respect to matters involving the corporation. For example,
Managers? Evidence from Tender Offer Bids, 32 J. FIN. ECON. 195, 198 (1993) (stating that
bidding firms with majority of independent directors earned significantly higher abnormal
returns from takeovers than other bidding firms, but that relationship between bidding firnis'
abnormal stock returns and proportion of board seats held by independent outside directors
is nonlinear). However, these studies did not test situations in which managers had acute
conflicts with shareholders. Even if future studies were to find that a unitary board
composed of more than a certain percentage of independent directors performed less well
on conflicts matters than a board composed of a lesser percentage of independent directors,
the reason may be related to the importance of various relational functions, such as the
availability of advice and information on the unitary board, rather than the unimportance of
having a determination on the conflicts transaction by a board composed solely of independ-
ent directors. Thus, a dual board structure with veto rights in a conflicts board would most
likely still improve the corporate governance system.
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directors who are employed by the corporation or who have other business
relationships with it should be excluded from this board. Controlling
shareholders should also be ineligible because their control of the corpora-
tion raises issues of potential conflicts with minority shareholders. If the
conflicts board is to be objective in reviewing conflicts transactions and in
making management accountable to all shareholders, the class of independ-
ent directors should not include inside directors, outside directors with busi-
ness relationships with the corporation, or controlling shareholders.
The eligibility criteria for independent directors should also be nar-
rowed to take account of business relationships between the corporation and
certain persons related in important ways to the potentially conflicted direc-
tor. Significant to independence are relationships between the proposed
director or his related persons, on the one hand, and executive officers,
business review board members, controlling shareholders, and possibly the
related persons of such persons, on the other hand.
One could argue that controlling shareholders and their related persons
should be eligible for membership on the conflicts board. After all, the
controlling shareholder has the power to select or remove these members.
The controlling shareholder's power is limited, however, to the selection
and removal process. No other significant relationships may exist between
the controlling shareholder and the conflicts board member. Of course,
corporations may disagree with this eligibility criteria. On the one hand,
corporations may allow controlling shareholders to serve on the conflicts
board. On the other hand, corporations may institute stringent requirements
for removal of members of the conflicts board by shareholders, longer
terms for conflicts board members, or a self-perpetuating conflicts board."°
Corporations may obtain guidance in determining eligibility criteria for
independent directors from the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
100. C. Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Critical Look at Corporate Governance, 45 VAND.
L. REV. 1263, 1301-17 (1992). Professor Mitchell proposes a self-perpetuating unitary
board called the "mediating board." Although this proposal overlooks the importance of
relational roles of the board other than conflicts monitoring, it is an interesting suggestion
that could be utilized by the conflicts board. I believe, however, that both spheres of
accountability - voting and fiduciary obligations - are important and that to some degree
the weaknesses of one system offsets the other. See Lynne L. Dallas, The Control and
Conflict of Interest Voting Systems, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1, 46-7 (1992). Professor Mitchell's
proposal relies only on the latter system, namely, fiduciary obligations. Mitchell, supra,
at 1307-08. Professor Mitchell's proposal could be evaluated by studying the many
nonprofit organizations. The results of these studies, however, would not be directly
applicable to for-profit corporations. Altruistic motives and goals play a large role in non-
profit corporations, which may offset diminished accountability features in the structure of
these corporations.
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(RMBCA), Chapter 8, Subchapter F; 101 the ALI's Principles of Corporate
Governance definitions of "interested" directors and "significant" relation-
ships; ° and the Securities and Exchange Commission's regulations on dis-
closure of important relationships between the corporation and its directors
and officers. 3 Business or legal groups may develop definitions of inde-
pendent directors and conflicting interests that are specifically tailored to
meet the demands of the dual board structure. Corporations are encouraged
to adopt similar definitions of these terms, which will allow meaningful
future studies of the effectiveness of dual boards.
The eligibility criteria for independent directors on the conflicts board
will not cover some ways that directors may be influenced by others in
the corporation. The fact that some influential relationships which these
directors have will fall through the cracks is inevitable and unavoidable.
For example, friendships and mutual associations through local community
groups may link members of the conflicts board with management, business
review board members, and controlling shareholders. However, the dual
board structure will mitigate these influences in ways that the unitary board
cannot. Normative influences on conflicts board members will be reduced
by (a) separate meetings of the conflicts board, (b) distinct goals resulting
from the conflicts board's separate responsibilities, and (c) the conflicts
board's control over its own members' nominations and compensation.
Informational influences will be mitigated by (a) social comparisons with
other members of the conflicts board, (b) responsibilities of a corporate
ombudsperson to provide information to conflicts board members, and
(c) the receipt of information and reports from others in the organization
through conflicts board procedures and at conflicts board meetings. The
development of a rule or norm that conflicts board members confine their
discussion of board matters to other conflicts board members and limit
their information gathering from corporation-related persons to channels
developed by the conflicts board itself may reinforce the latter mitigating
factor.
2. Functions of the Conflicts Board
The board of directors of the corporation initially establishing the dual
board (with the approval of shareholders) must decide which issues the
CEO should refer to the conflicts board and which issues should be decided
101. REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.60-8.63 (1990).
102. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, §§ 1.03, 1.23, 1.34.
103. 17 C.F.R. 229.404 (1996).
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by the business review board. I propose that the following general func-
tions be allocated to the conflicts board:
" Select, regularly evaluate, fix the compensation of, and, when appro-
priate, replace the corporation's principal senior executives, external
auditor, and board ombudsperson;
" Review and, when appropriate, approve corporate actions that raise
duty of loyalty issues for any senior executive officer, business
review director, or controlling shareholder;
" Review and, when appropriate, initiate or approve decisions that in-
volve a change of control of the corporation;
" Review and, when appropriate, initiate or approve major changes in
auditing and accounting principles and practices to be used in the
preparation of the corporation's financial statements; and
" Review and, when appropriate, initiate or approve decisions respect-
ing legal compliance and ethical standards of the corporation and its
employees.
These functions are discussed in the following subsections.
a. Executive Selection and Compensation
Because the conflicts board is composed solely of independent direc-
tors, it should select and compensate the senior executive officers of the
corporation. The business review board is not in a position to perform
these functions. To place these functions in the business review board
would mean that inside directors and nonindependent outside directors
would be reviewing their own performance (or qualifications) or the perfor-
mance (or qualifications) of others who have, or may have, a substantial
say in their future business with the corporation.
An argument can be made opposing the allocation of these functions
to the conflicts board. Through its power to oversee the senior executives
of the corporation, the conflicts board may interfere with general business
policies adopted by the business review board. In most cases, conflict will
not occur. The conflicts board will judge executive officers on fulfilling
their obligations to both boards. However, if a disagreement between
boards occurs, the ultimate power over business direction is in the hands
of the conflicts board through its control over the selection and compensa-
tion of executive officers. Most likely, executives officers will retain
substantial influence over the business review board. Through its control
over executive selection and compensation, the conflicts board provides a
check and balance when, in its judgment, executive officers are not acting
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in the best interests of the corporation. In this respect, the conflicts board
is the premier board. I discuss conflicts between boards further in Part lI.C
of this Article.
b. Duty of Loyalty Issues
The conflicts board, according to my guidelines, would also make all
decisions raising duty of loyalty issues respecting any senior executive,
business review director, or controlling shareholder (designated persons).
If any one of these persons has a "conflicting interest," the matter must be
directed by the CEO to the conflicts board for resolution. The same
principles used to define independent director can be used to identify a duty
of loyalty issue. The objective is to determine whether the designated
person has a conflict of interest with respect to a particular issue confront-
ing the corporation. Once any such conflict is identified, the issue should
be handled by the conflicts board.
Most definitions of conflicting interests take into account only the
financial and familial conflicts that a person has with respect to corporate
transactions. Arguably, such a definition of conflicting interests is incom-
plete. Other sources of personal conflict exist. For example, persons may
have the incentive to seek nonfinancial values such as power and prestige
for themselves. Managers may expand the corporation or make a tender
offer to obtain personal power and prestige. Managers may also seek
greater personal security by having the corporation maintain a low debt-to-
equity ratio. Some corporate scholars have argued that once a corporation
decides to sell all its assets or to dissolve, managers have a conflict of
interest with respect to all subsequent transactions of the corporation
because no continuing business exists that would subject them to the disci-
pline of the market after the transaction (the final period problem). 104 It is
naive to believe, however, that any real world governance system can take
into account all of these motivations. It is possible that certain kinds of
transactions can be identified that are entered into by management primarily
for these reasons and that usually bring corporations lower returns than
other available opportunities. 1" These identified transactions could be
allocated to the conflicts board. Of course, deciding to allocate transactions
to the conflicts board assumes that members of the conflicts board do not
have similar motivations concerning these transactions, at least not to the
degree that business review board directors do.
104. RONALD J. GiLSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 720-21 (2d ed. 1995).
105. Dallas, supra note 100, at 76-77.
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The burden of identifying nonfinancial conflicts probably outweighs the
benefits of doing so. Practical guidelines that establish a workable system
for readily identifying issues assigned to the conflicts board or the business
review board need to be developed. A definition of independent directors
that is drawn narrowly to take account of financial and familial conflicts
moves in that direction. I believe that such a definition would permit
corporations to benefit substantially from the dual board structure.
I would exclude from duty of loyalty issues assigned to the conflicts
board the nomination and compensation of business review members other
than inside directors."°6 The two boards should operate separately, with
their own selection and compensation processes. This division will de-
crease the likelihood of conflicts between the boards and over-involvement
with each other's iffairs. It should be noted that, although business review
members have a conflict of interest on these issues, so too do conflicts
board members in determining their own nominations and compensation.
Arguably, each board should determine the other board's compensation.
At least on the part of the conflicts board, however, such a rule would
destroy its desired independence from management and other noninde-
pendent directors on the business review board.
Under the dual board system, board members or nominees would have
the responsibility for identifying conflicting interests and notifying the
corporation's CEO of the conflicts. The corporation, however, should
periodically provide these directors or nominees with information and work
sheets that would assist them in identifying any conflicts of interest that
exist.
c. Control Changes
The unitary board of directors acting alone or with the concurrence of
shareholders may take actions that have the effect of changing control of the
corporation. Under the dual board structure, the conflicts board would be
responsible for these actions. These actions include those that affect the
control relationship between management and shareholders, such as adopt-
ing, modifying, or deleting staggered board and board removal pro-
visions; ° actions that alter the control relationship between controlling and
minority shareholders, such as changes in cumulative voting provisions; °8
and actions that affect both of these relationships, such as those affecting
106. Executive officers are usually not separately compensated for serving on their
corporations' boards of directors.
107. Dallas, supra note 100, at 54-59.
108. Id. at 59-60.
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supermajority shareholder voting provisions.1' 9 In addition, control changes
occur when proposed transactions have any of the following four effects on
corporate control: (a) a person or group emerges with a controlling interest
in the corporation; (b) a person or group loses a controlling interest in the
corporation; (c) management becomes entrenched as a result of the transac-
tion, such as by the payment of greenmail or sale of stock to a friendly
person; or (d) shareholder voting rights are substantially diluted or effec-
tively nullified by the transaction."' Finally, defensive tactics involve
control changes or managerial conflicts and, therefore, should be considered
by the conflicts board. Defensive tactics may be identified as transactions
or provisions that are (a) conditioned on a change of control or (b) outside
the normal course of business of the corporation and are adopted when a
tender offer is imminent or pending."' Workable guidelines can be written
to allow CEOs to identify readily matters involving control changes to be
allocated to the conflicts board.
One can argue that members of the conflicts board also have con-
flicting interests when matters involve control changes. The interests of
members of the conflicts board, however, are not of the magnitude of the
interests of an inside director or nonindependent outside director on the
business review board, who have interests in addition to the board member-
ships at stake.
d. Auditing
The conflicts board should oversee the auditing processes of the
corporation because of the importance of financial information to assessing
the performance of the corporation's executive officers. This oversight
process ensures the independence of the corporation's external auditor and
the corporation's internal auditing department. Numerous legal and busi-
ness groups recommend that independent directors perform these oversight
functions.112 Many corporations have organized audit committees of the
109. Id. at 60-62.
110. Id. at 62-65.
111. Id. at 67-70.
112. AM. STOCK EXCH., AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY GUIDE § 121 (1996);
NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, DEALERS MANUAL, Rule 4460(d) (1996); N.Y. STOCK
EXCH., NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303 (1996); see also
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOvERNANCE, supra note 1, § 3.05 ("The audit committee...
should be composed exclusively of directors who are neither employed by the corporation
nor were so employed within the two preceding years, including at least a majority of
members who have no significant relationship [§1.34] with the corporation's senior execu-
fives."); ABA Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 1, at 1627; ABA Comm. on Corp. Laws,
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board composed solely of independent directors."' Thus, the importance
of allocating these functions to independent directors is well established.
The corporation may refer to Section 3A.03 of the ALI's Principles of
Corporate Governance"4 for a delineation of the audit-related functions that
should be performed by the conflicts board or a cbmmittee thereof.
e. Legal and Ethical Behavior
I propose that the conflicts board also consider legal and ethical
matters relating to the corporation. The evidence is mixed, however, on
whether a relationship exists between independent directors on corporate
boards and corporate social responsibility.' For example, a 1988 study
(1980 data) found that Fortune 500 industrial organizations with large
boards dominated by outside directors were positively associated with
customer, environmental, and overall social responsibility as measured by
two independent judges." 6 However, a 1992 study of Fortune 500 compa-
nies (1984 data) found a positive relation between inside directors and
corporate philanthropy as measured by the percentage of corporate pretax
earnings devoted to charitable contributions." 7 This study also found a
positive relationship between the proportion of women and minorities on
corporate boards and corporate philanthropy, although the association had
only moderate statistical significance."'
The Overview Committees of the Board of Directors, 34 Bus. LAW. 1337, 1350-61 (1979);
Business Roundtable, supra note 1, at 249.
113. HEIDRICK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BOARD 6 (1988); KORN/FERRY
INT'L, supra note 78, at 13; MKTG. Div., N.Y. STOCK EXCH., COPORATE GOVERNANCE -
SUR vEY OF CORPORATE BOARDS, STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION 2-4, 6 (1979); Analysis of
Results of 1981 Proxy Statement Disclosure Monitoring Program, Exchange Act Release
No. 18,532, 47 Fed. Reg. 10,792, 10,799, tbl. 15.1 (1982).
114. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, § 3A.03.
115. See, e.g., Nabil A. Ibrahim & John P. Angelidis, The Corporate Social Respon-
siveness Orientation of Board Members: Are There Differences Between Inside and Outside
Directors?, 14 J. Bus. ETHICS 405, 408-09 (1995); Judge, supra note 91, at 2-3, 5-6;
Idalene F. Kesner et al., Board Composition and the Commission of Illegal Acts: An Investi-
gation of Fortune 500 Companies, 29 AcAD. MGMT. J. 789, 794-98 (1986); Jia Wang &
Betty S. Coffey, Board Composition and Corporate Philanthropy, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 771,
775-76 (1992); Shaker A. Zahra & Wilbur W. Stanton, The Implications of Board of
Directors' Composition for Corporate Strategy and Performance, 5 INT'L J. MGMT. 229, 233
(1988).
116. Zahra & Stanton, supra note 115, at 232-33.
117. Wang & Coffey, supra note 115, at 775-76.
118. Id. at 774-75, 777.
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A director's interest in legal and ethical conduct by the corporation
may not correlate to the director's views on corporate philanthropy. A
1995 study found that both inside and outside directors felt that corporations
should behave ethically and within the law, but that outside directors were
more concerned than inside directors with corporate -philanthropy."1 9 The
study, however, tested directors' revealed intentions rather than actual
behavior.
Because of the mixed results of these studies, no conclusions can be
drawn from them. Also, the studies cannot be compared meaningfully
because of their use of different methodologies, data, and measurements of
corporate social responsibility. Nevertheless, I suggest that ethical and
legal compliance issues be assigned to the conflicts board. I believe that
competitive pressures of businesses are felt more deeply by inside directors
than by independent directors and that these pressures often result in
unethical and unlawful behavior. ° Overview of these issues by independ-
ent directors will, I believe, contribute to corporate social responsibility.
B. The Business Review Board
1. Composition
The composition of the business review board would resemble the
current unitary board. The participation of management (inside directors)
in the selection of directors on the business review board is acceptable
because management is often in a good position to identify directors that
will provide valuable relational resources to the corporation. These direc-
tors may perform various coordination, informational, service, and co-
optative roles for the corporation. Unlike conflicts board members, busi-
ness review board members often contribute to the corporation because of
their relationships with it. Independent directors may also serve on this
board because of their expertise or objectivity. 121
119. Ibrahim & Angelidis, supra note 115, at 408-09.
120. See Shaker A. Zahra, Unethical Practices in Competitive Analysis: Patterns,
Causes and Effects, 13 J. Bus. ETIcs 53, 58-59 (1994) (discussing survey that found some
executives view competitors as enemies and thus believe that any means of gaining advan-
tage is permissible).
121. In a survey of chairpersons of the nation's largest industrial and service parent cor-
porations as listed by Fortune, Heidricks and Struggles, Inc. found that the most important
personality characteristics sought in directors were objectivity, intelligence, and honesty.
HErimcK & STRUGGLES, INC., THE CHANGING BoARD 10 (1990).
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2. Functions of the Business Review Board
I propose that the business review board perform the following func-
tions:
" Oversee the conduct of the business to evaluate whether the business
is being properly managed;
" Review and, when appropriate, initiate or approve the corporation's
major strategic plans and corporate financial objectives; and
" Review and, when appropriate, initiate or approve major disinter-
ested corporate transactions.
The business review board oversees the overall business operations of
the corporation. Some critics may argue against the composition of this
board and current unitary boards. Critics may assert that the business of
the corporation will suffer if persons with business relations with the
corporation have a role in reviewing such issues. Nonindependent directors
may influence the corporation to develop its business in ways that will
benefit them personally. For example, a banker who does business with the
corporation may influence the corporation to take on more debt or to avoid
additional debt in order not to jeopardize the payment of debt already out-
standing. A supplier of important components to the corporation may
through his position on the board push the corporation toward producing
products utilizing these components when more profitable opportunities are
available elsewhere.
This criticism of proposed members of the business review board is not
persuasive, however, because of the relational benefits to be obtained by
having such members on the board. The supplier and the banker are
usually on the board because management wants them there. They provide
important resources on which the corporation is to some degree dependent.
Like contracts and mergers, board memberships permit mutually advanta-
geous arrangements that reduce costs and produce benefits. Without such
board memberships, these parties would have to proceed through arguably
inferior arrangements. 1"
Business policies also benefit from the informed input of persons with
an economic stake in the enterprise. Many stakeholders are dependent on
the corporation and are interested in its well-being. Board memberships
assist the corporation in obtaining valued input and in pursuing policies
responsive to an uncertain environment. Consistent with power coalition
122. Dallas, supra note 2, at 6-7, 11.
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theory, these stakeholders to some degree comprise the corporation and are
an integral part of it."
The dual board is also an improvement over the unitary board in that
it mitigates to some degree the conflicts that these directors have. The
conflicts board, composed of independent directors, reviews and approves
all transactions that involve the business review directors. The conflicts
board also has ultimate control over policy through its responsibility for the
selection and compensation of the corporation's executive officers.
C. Conflicts Between Boards
Conflicts between boards may arise in a number of situations:
(a) disagreements on issues decided by either board, such as the perfor-
mance of executive officers or the advisability of particular transactions;
(b) characterizations of a director as independent; and (c) decisions on
whether an issue involves conflicting interests so that it should be allocated
to the conflicts board. This section explores communications between the
boards and legal remedies for breaches of fiduciary duty when a director
or CEO fails to comply with internally developed procedures for the dual
board or otherwise acts contrary to the interests of the corporation. In
addition, this section examines the social dynamics of conflicts to assess
whether two boards will produce disadvantages that may interfere with the
efficient functioning of the corporation.
1. Communications Between the Boards
Each board should have the right to obtain reports from members of
the other board and employees of the corporation that pertain to matters
properly before it. For example, the conflicts board, in evaluating the
CEO, may want to obtain the judgment of the business review board.
Similarly, the business review board may wish to understand the conflicts
board's bases for rejecting a business transaction with an interested director
or for agreeing to a change in accounting principles. The CEO may pro-
vide useful information to both boards. The board ombudsperson would
also serve as an impoftant source of information for the conflicts board."
2. Legal Avenues for Redress
The dual board will not require a change in law concerning basic
fiduciary obligations of directors. Nevertheless, the procedures for deriva-
123. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
124. See infra notes 158-67 (discussing functions of proposed board ombudsperson).
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tive actions and the standard of review courts apply to certain challenged
transactions of the corporation are likely to change. For example, courts
that excuse demand on the unitary board when the majority of directors are
interested will rarely excuse demand with the dual board system.'25 This
is because demand can always be made on the conflicts board that is com-
posed of independent directors. Also, in those rare cases alleging breaches
of the duty of care by conflicts board members," demand can be made on
the business review board. With respect to standards of review, courts may
apply the deferential business judgment rule"2 to decisions by the conflict
board, even though business review board members have conflicts of
interest with respect to those decisions.1" The standard of review applied
to change of control cases would probably not change because the standard
applied already takes into account the independence of directors and the loss
of board positions that may come about as a result of a control change.129
125. E.g., Heineman v. Datapoint Corp., 611 A.2d 950, 952 (Del. 1992); Grobow v.
Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 186 (Del. 1988); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).
126. E.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1982); Miller v. AT & T, 507
F.2d 759, 761 (3d Cir. 1974); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985);
Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963); Shlensky v. Wrigley,
237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814
(N.J. 1981); PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, § 4.01.
127. See supra note 81.
128. This result is similar to decisions of some courts to apply the business judgment
rule when a majority of the disinterested directors of the corporation approve the transac-
tion, even though the other directors on the board are interested. See, e.g., Puma v.
Marriott, 283 A.2d 693, 695-96 (Del. Ch. 1971); see also PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE, supra note 1, § 5.02 (applying intermediate standard of review that falls
somewhere between business judgment rule and fairness test).
129. In tender offer cases, Delaware courts usually apply an enhanced business
judgment rule to review defensive decisions made by target company boards. This standard
of review was first adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985):
Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is
an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the
protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred....
... In the face of this inherent conflict directors must show that they had
reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effective-
ness existed because of another person's stock ownership .... However, they
satisfy that burden "by showing good faith and reasonable investigation. ...."
Furthermore, such proof is materially enhanced, as here, by the approval of a
board comprised of a majority of outside directors who have acted in accordance
with the foregoing standards.
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With a dual board, it is conceivable that one board will sue the other
board to challenge decisions by the other board allegedly made in breach
of its fiduciary duties. This possibility is not unusual; under Germany's
two-tiered board system, discussed later in this Article, one board may sue
the other. 30 Cases of this nature, however, would be rare. Duty of loyalty
issues are allocated to the conflicts board, which means that challenges to
such transactions will probably be analyzed under a deferential standard of
review.' Because of this lower standard of court scrutiny, fewer actions
will be brought. Moreover, actions brought by boards rather than share-
holders may discourage litigation if, as some claim,' the primary motiva-
tion for many shareholder actions is to obtain plaintiff attorneys fees. From
the corporation's perspective, duly elected directors may be more preferable
as plaintiffs than self-appointed shareholders.'33 Moreover, such actions for
breaches of fiduciary duty will be simplified when brought by one board
against the other because litigation is not necessary on the issue of demand
and on decisions by independent litigation committees. 13
... [Moreover, if] a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the
business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
Id. at 954-55. For more recent tender offer decisions, see In re Time Warner Inc. Sec.
Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1993); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Net-
work, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,
571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989); and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc.,
506 A. 2d 173 (Del. 1986).
130. See infra text accompanying notes 232-33.
131. This lower standard of review is referred to as the business judgment rule. See
supra note 81.
132. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff's Attorney: The Implications
of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions,
86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-81 (1986); Richard W. Duesenberg, The Business Judgment
Rule and Shareholder Derivative Suits: A Wiew from the Inside, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 311, 333
(1982); Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 55, 57 (1991). But see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plainiff's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommen-
dations for Reform, 58 U. CmI. L. REV. 1, 65 (1991) (noting that strike suits are rare).
133. Duesenberg, supra note 132, at 340-41.
134. E.g., Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1538-39 (11th Cir. 1990); Hasan v.
Clevetrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 1984); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d
880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 687 (E.D. Mich.
1980); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785-88 (Del. 1981); Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 966-67
(Del. Ch. 1985); Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 508 (Del. Ch. 1984), aft'd, 499 A.2d
1184 (Del. 1985); Miller v. Register & Trib. Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709, 718 (Iowa
1983); Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58 (Mass. 1990); Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d
994, 1001-02 (N.Y. 1979); Alford v. Shaw, 358 S.E.2d 323, 325-26 (N.C. 1987); James
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What about harassment of one board by the other board through
threatening or bringing lawsuits? For instance, the business review board
could sue the conflicts board for rejecting an inadvisable transaction in
which business review directors were personally interested. Harassment of
this nature is no more likely with a dual board than with a unitary board,
except that directors may have more reasons to complain because fewer
interested transactions may be approved by independent directors on the
conflicts board. Under the unitary board system, shareholders can bring
actions against directors that are often viewed by management as harass-
ment. These include actions brought by director-shareholders who chal-
lenge a decision of the unitary board with which they disagree.
As for actions involving the failure of a director to reveal conflicting
interests that result in either the director improperly serving on the conflicts
board or the improper assignment of transactions to boards, it is the direc-
tor failing to disclose his conflicting interest who has potential liability. If
the director has improperly assumed a position on the conflicts board, an
injunction that relieves her of that position should be sufficient. A transac-
tion decided by the business review board that should have been decided by
the conflicts board should not be enjoined, unless the transaction only
involves the director (or a related person) who has failed to disclose his.
interest. Ordinarily, approval of a transaction by the wrong board should
not affect the transaction's validity. A director who knowingly or unrea-
sonably fails to disclose his interest may be held responsible for damages
suffered by the corporation that are attributed to his failure to disclose.
Under the dual board system, the two boards and the corporation's
CEO will be responsible for adopting and implementing a reasonable
system for identifying independent directors and for assisting directors in
identifying their conflicting interests. The usual standards applicable to
directors and officers would apply to the fulfillment of these responsibili-
ties. Under existing corporate law, directors and officers must exercise the
care of a reasonably prudent person in a like position under similar circum-
stances.13 Directors are not often found liable under this standard.136
D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation's Voice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of
Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DuKE L.J. 959, 966-69, 973; Charles W. Murdock,
Corporate Governance - The Role of Special Litigation Committees, 68 WASH. L. REV. 79,
84-85 (1993).
135. For a detailed summary of the body of law relating to directors' duty of care, see
PRiNcms oF CoRpoRATE GOVERNANcE, supra note 1, § 4.01, reporter's notes, at 155-61.
136. See Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the
Indemnification of Corporate Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1099 (1968). But
see Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Duty of Care Riddles Wisely
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3. Dissension at the Top?
Although the dual board structure is designed to equip the corporation
to handle conflicting interests more effectively, the reader may be con-
cerned that a second board will introduce undue conflict at the top decision-
making level of the corporation. Even with clear guidelines for the assign-
ment by the CEO of matters to the conflicts and business review boards, the
boards may disagree with each other's actions and express hostility through
reports to and requests for reports from the other board, executive officers,
or other employees of the corporation. Or, the CEO may try to pit the two
boards against each other as a means of deflecting criticism of his perfor-
mance.
Social psychologists have found that intergroup conflicts are heightened
by: (a) the competition or incompatible goals among groups; (b) a desire
to bolster the self-esteem of in-group members; and (c) a process of cogni-
tive simplification in which out-group members are negatively stereo-
typed.137 The dual board structure is not constructed to place the boards in
competition with each other. Each board has its primary area of responsi-
bility. Compensation to one board does not diminish compensation to the
other. Moreover, the goals of the boards are not incompatible; each board
is under fiduciary obligations to act in the best interests of the corporation.
Even in the absence of incompatible goals or competition, some studies
have found that randomly formed and arbitrarily labeled groups tend to
positively value their group relative to out-groups.' Devaluation of the
out-group is not always involved, however, but a process of increasing the
feelings of belongingness of in-group members generally occurs."' Al-
though this process may result in comparatively valuing one group over
another, it is not necessarily related to hostility that would require interfer-
ence by one group with goals sought by the other."4t
A negative effect of group formation is that board members may be
inclined to engage in cognitive simplification that results in negative stereo-
Expounded, 24 SuFFOLK U. L. REV. 923, 946-49 (1990) (listing cases finding due care
violations); John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation and Corporate Governance: An Essay on Steering
Between Scylla and Charybdis, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 789, 796 (1984) (noting that
number of reported decisions finding duty of care violations do not take account of those
cases that are settled).
137. E.g., BARON ET AL., supra note 44, at 134-38.
138. See id. at 135-36; Jacob M. Rabbie, The Effects of Intergroup Competition and Co-
operation on Intragroup and Intergroup Relationships, in COOPERATION AND HELPING BEHAV-
IOR: THEORIES AND RESEARCH 123, 130 (Valerian J. Derlega & Janusz Gizelak eds., 1982).
139. Rabbie, supra note 138, at 131.
140. Id. at 133.
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typing and social bias against the other board group.14 This categorization
effect occurs because of the desire of persons to simplify their environment.
Due to infrequent contact between in-group and out-group members,
"illusory correlations" are often made that exaggerate negative experiences
with out-group members." Also, "attribution errors" are made. The bad
behavior of out-group members is attributed to bad character as opposed to
situational factors that are often the explanation for bad behavior by in-
group members. 43 It is, therefore, likely that some of this categorization
will occur. Members on the conflicts board, for example, may be per-
ceived by business review board members as fluffy, impractical, or lawyer-
like. Conflicts board members may perceive business review directors as
being out for themselves or insensitive to shareholder concerns. Some
competition for prestige may also occur between the two boards. The
methods suggested by social psychologists for mitigating these effects, such
as breaking down group boundary lines and close contact among members
of different groups, are not options for the dual board system. However,
this kind of stereotyping can be addressed by (a) making board members
aware of these findings from social psychology1" and (b) selecting for
membership on the conflicts board persons who have served on the business
review board of other corporations, and vice versa.
The CEO may also use conflict between boards as a means to mask his
inadequate performance. Studies have shown that threatened leaders are
more likely to generate hostility toward out-groups than leaders that feel
more secure in their tenure. 5 The CEO, for example, may view himself
as aligned with the business review board against the conflicts board.
Despite this possibility, there are clean lines of authority built into the dual
board system. The conflict board has the authority to fire the CEO without
the cooperation of the business review board. Such conflicts are, therefore,
likely to be short-lived. Moreover, the conflicts signal the existence of a
problem that needs to be addressed. In conclusion, I would not oppose the
141. BARON ET AL., supra note 44, at 136-38.
142. Id. at 139-40.
143. Id. at 143.
144. See Jody Amour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 759-60 (1995) (concluding that alerting jurors
to stereotypes may reduce discrimination in jury decision making). But see Linda Hamilton
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1245-47 (1995) ("Cognitive
psychologists have told us more about the shortcomings of human social inference cognition
than about how the various biases they identify can be reduced or controlled.").
145. Rabbie, supra note 138, at 142.
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dual board structure for fear of introducing unwarranted conflict at the top
decision-making level of the corporation.
D. Is Legislation Needed to Permit a Dual Board Structure?
RMBCA Section 8.01 provides that the business and affairs of the
corporation shall be managed by or under the direction of its board of
directors, subject to limitations in the articles of incorporation or an effec-
tive shareholders' agreement." Similar provisions are found in state
statutes.147 The comments to Section 8.01 of the RMBCA provide that such
a "board of directors is the traditional form of corporate governance, but
it need not be the exclusive form."'" This statement implies that public
policy considerations do not preclude other forms of corporate governance,
such as the dual board.149
Nevertheless, the RMBCA and state corporation statutes do not con-
template two-board systems. Statutory provisions that limit the delegation
of board authority to board committees, for example, say nothing about the
allocation of those functions among different boards."s Moreover, flexibil-
ity with respect to board structure, such as doing away with a board of
directors altogether, is limited to closely held corporations by these
statutes."' Therefore, modifications of state corporation law are necessary
to permit public corporations to use the dual board structure proposed in
this Article.
HI. The Second Board Reform Proposal: The Board Ombudsperson
I also recommend that a board ombudsperson be appointed to a full-
time position by independent directors on the conflicts board or unitary
146. REv. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (1990).
147. CAL. CORP. CODE § 300 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991); IND.
CODE ANN. § 23-1-33-1(b) (Michie 1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1501 (West
1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701 (McKinney 1986); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1721
(West 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-673 (Michie 1993).
148. REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. Acr § 8.01 cmts.
149. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL's CLOSE CORPORATIONS
§§ 5.01-.41 (3d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1996).
150. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c) (1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-34-6 (Michie
1995); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1528 (West 1990); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 712
(McKinney 1986); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1731 (West 1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
689 (Michie 1993).
151. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 351 (1991); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2A.45 (West
1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-33-1(c) (Michie 1995); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2332
(West 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1821 (West 1992).
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board. The ombudsperson should meet qualifications established to assure
her independence from management. The main responsibility of the board
ombudsperson would be to gather information for independent directors and
to make recommendations to them based on this information. In Part HI,
I discuss proposed qualifications, functions, and other requirements of a
board ombudsperson. I also compare this proposed ombudsperson with the
corporate ombudsperson position that is currently employed by a number
of U.S. corporations.
A. Introduction to Corporate and Board Ombudspersons
The corporate ombudsperson operates outside the corporation's formal
hierarchy to solve problems requiring a certain amount of impartiality. 52
In 1993, over five hundred U.S. corporations had corporate ombudsper-
sons."' These appointments were consistent with various industry trends:
"increased employee participation, renewed emphasis on ethics, heightened
awareness of sexual harassment, and finding alternative means of resolving
disputes.""4 These ombudspersons mainly deal with management-employee
relations and are hired by the corporation's CEO.15 It is often said that the
support of top-management is essential for the effective operation of these
ombudspersons. 5 1 This may be attributed mainly to the ombudsperson's
152. OMBUDSMAN ASs'N, OMBuDSMAN HANDBOOK 1-1, 1-4, 3-6, 5-3 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK].
153. Junda Woo, More Businesses Use Ombudsmen to Prevent Workplace Litigation,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1993, at B10 (referring to corporations with five hundred or more
employees). Ombudspersons are used in a wide variety of industries (regulated and
nonregulated), nonprofit organizations, and governmental bodies. See John P. Flaherty &
Maureen E. Lally-Green, The European Union: Where Is It Now?, 34 DUQ. L. REv. 923,
959 (1996) (discussing European Parliament ombudsman); Michael R. Geroe & Thomas K.
Gump, Hungary and a New Paradigm for the Protection of Ethnic Minorities in Central and
Eastern Europe, 32 COLuM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673, 686 (1995) (reviewing parliamentary
ombudsman); Robert E. Lutz, A Piece of the Peace: The Human Rights Accord and the
Guatemalan Peace Process, 2 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 183, 195 (1994) (commenting on
governmental human rights ombudsman); Fred L. Morrison, The Constitution of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 13 CONST. COMMENT 145, 153 (1996); James T. Ziegenfuss, Jr., The
Corporate Ombudsman at Work in Health Care, Banking, Utility, and Transportation Firms,
NAT'L PRODUCTvrITY REv., Spring 1995, at 97.
154. Justin Martin, New Tricks for an Old Trade: The Changing Role of the Ombuds-
than, ACROSS THE BOARD, June 1, 1992, at 40, 42.
155. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc., Ombuds Jobs Are Proliferating and Characterized
by Diversity, 2 PRAC. & PERSPECTIVE 198, 198-99 (1988); James T. Ziegenfuss, Jr. et al.,
Corporate Ombudsmen, PERSONNEL WORLD, Mar. 1989, at 76.
156. E.g., OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 152, at 5-2; Minda Zetlin, A Neutral
Third Party, MGMT. REV., Sept. 1, 1992, at 50, 52.
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role in resolving disputes between lower-level managers and employees.
Without such support, the ombudsperson may not be given the deference
necessary to assist in these controversies.
The board ombudsperson proposed in this Article is also a person
outside the formal structure of the corporation. The board ombudsperson's
independence of management is crucial, however, to her effective function-
ing.157 She is not expected to work out disputes with management on
employee and other issues, but is expected to serve mainly as an informa-
tion conduit for independent directors on the board. Moreover, she would
be appointed by independent directors and not by management.
B. Functions and Benefits of Corporate and Board Ombudspersons
Important distinctions exist between the currently functioning corpo-
rate ombudsperson and the board ombudsperson proposed in this Article.
Corporate ombudspersons most frequently deal with various personnel
policies, such as performance evaluations, terminations, work assignments
and transfers, and various forms of harassment within the workplace." 8
Corporate ombudspersons perform a number of functions in attempting to
resolve these issues: communicating information, counseling, problem-
solving, fact-finding, negotiating, mediating, and operating as a safety net
and change agent.'5 9 Corporate ombudspersons are expected to perform
these functions informally rather than publicly"6° and to maintain confi-
dences. 61 These functions performed in the employment context can pro-
157. The board ombudsperson's functions and her independence, safeguarded by an
appropriate process of selection and requirements concerning eligibility, distinguish her from
the ombudsperson proposed by Victor Futter. Futter's "corporate" ombudsperson that
reports to the board is more similar to existing corporate ombudspersons than to my board
ombudsperson. She performs similar functions to corporate ombudspersons. For example,
she is expected to work closely with management to resolve problems. She also must be
approved by the CEO and may be a former employee of the corporation. See Victor Futter,
An Answer to the Public Perception of Corporations: A Corporate Ombudsperson?, 46 Bus.
LAW. 29, 35 (1990); see also Elmer W. Johnson, An Insider's Call for Outside Direction,
HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 46, 54-55.
158. Ziegenfuss et al., supra note 155, at 78-79.
159. OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 152, at 1-5, 1-6; Ziegenfuss et al., supra
note 152, at 78.
160. OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 152, at 1-3, 1-4.
161. Id. at 1-3, 3-1 to 3-4. For articles exploring the issue of whether communications
with a corporate ombudsperson should be privileged, see Brenda V. Thompson, Comment,
Corporate Ombudsmen and Privileged Communications: Should Employee Communications
to Corporate Ombudsmen Be Entitled to Privilege?, 61 U. CIN. L. REv. 653 (1992);
Privileged Communication Extended to the Corporate Ombudsman-Employee Relationship
Via Federal Rule of Evidence 501, 1991 J. DISPUTE RESOL. 367.
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duce a number of benefits for the corporation, such as productivity im-
provements, savings of management time by defusing potentially disruptive
personnel problems, employee turnover improvements, litigation cost
savings in deflecting possible labor lawsuits, feedback to senior manage-
ment resulting in beneficial changes in corporate policies and procedures,
and evidence under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' of a compliance pro-
gram designed to ferret out wrongdoing that may decrease corporate liabil-
ity resulting from employee misconduct.162
In contrast, board ombudspersons would assist boards in performing
conflicts monitoring, which would involve conflicts of interest situations,
changes of control, auditing and accounting issues, and legal and ethical
compliance matters. The board ombudsperson's functions would include
the following:
" Communicating information to the conflicts board to provide useful
feedback on the implementation of corporate policies and other
matters relevant to the conflicts board's responsibilities;
" Investigating facts in areas brought to the conflicts board's attention
by management or others;
" Serving as a safety net and early warning device for problems facing
the corporation by providing an information outlet for whistleblow-
ers; and
* Operating as a change agent through recommendations to the board
on corporate policies, actions, and procedures.
The board ombudsperson is also expected to maintain confidences and to
proceed informally rather than publicly, although the board may permit her
to report to shareholders in the corporation's annual report. 63 To perform
her functions effectively, the board ombudsperson should have access to
employees at all levels of the organization and to the books and records of
the corporation.'" She should also be permitted to attend all board and
committee meetings (including those of the business review board). 65 A
board ombudsperson may provide substantial benefits to the board, which
include: (a) an independent, informed perspective on performance of senior
executive officers; (b) facts on whether matters have been properly allo-
162. See OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 152, at 4-2 to 4-6; Robert Coulson, Can
Employee Lawsuits Be Avoided?, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 1, 1993, at 3, 7; Carole M. Trocchio, Just
What Is an Ombudsman?, FRANCHISING WORLD, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 36.
163. Accord Futter, supra note 157, at 36-38.
164. See id. at 36; see also OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 152, at 3-1, 5-5.
165. Futter, supra note 157, at 36; see also Richard D. Greenfield, The Casefor the
Corporate Ombudsman, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 7, 1989, at 19.
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cated between boards; (c) information concerning transactions to be consid-
ered by the board, including the identity of others interested in the transac-
tions and on whether the board should hire outside experts; (d) follow-up on
audit-related matters and recommendations thereon; and (e) early identifica-
tion of unlawful or unethical activity. The latter benefit results from the
board ombudsperson's position outside the corporate hierarchy. Whistle-
blowing is encouraged concerning misconduct which often involves lower-
level employees responding to competitive pressures from higher-level man-
agers."s The board ombudsperson's function could also serve to eliminate or
diminish corporate liability for employee misconduct under the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. 16
C. Selection and Qualifications of Corporate and Board Ombudspersons
As previously noted, the CEO usually appoints the corporate ombuds-
person because the support of top management is considered essential for her
to function effectively. Most corporate ombudspersons are long-time em-
ployees of the corporation who have worked for the corporation for ten to
twenty years. 6 ' These ombudspersons are chosen for their detailed knowl-
edge about how things are done within the corporation. 69 They are also
selected because of their excellent interpersonal skills. 70
Although neutrality and lack of conflicts are considered important to the
corporate ombudsperson, emphasis is often placed on "perceptions" of
independence, personal characteristics of the ombudsperson, and possibly
naive agreements. The handbook of the Ombudsman Association (Hand-
book), for example, states that the ombudsperson should be "perceived" as
fair "with integrity to withstand pressures from senior management." '7' The
Handbook reports that mid-career ombudspersons are often hired with the
"clear" understanding that actions taken as an ombudsperson will not affect
their future careers."z While tradeoffs might be justified between independ-
166. Futter, supra note 157, at 35-37.
167. Frank J. Navran, Develop an Ethics Policy Now, TRANSP. & DISTRIBUTION, Feb.
1992, at 27.
168. Ziegenfuss et al., supra note 155, at 79; see also OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra
note 152, at 1-9 ("An estimated 90 percent of corporate ombudsmen worked for their
employer before being chosen to be the ombudsman."); Zetlin, supra note 156, at 52
(discussing MIT survey that shows average tenure of sixteen years).
169. Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, Inc., supra note 155, at 198-99; see OMBUDSMAN HAND-
BOOK, supra note 152, at 1-3; Zetlin, supra note 156, at 52.
170. OMBUDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 152, at 5-1, 5-6.
171. Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added).
172. Id. at 1-9.
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ence and expertise in this context, such a tradeoff is not justified for the
board ombudsperson.
The board ombudsperson should truly be independent. She should have
no significant relationship with the corporation"r for at least three years prior
to and after her tenure as ombudsperson. Eligibility requirements developed
for conflicts board members should also be applied to board ombudspersons.
Board ombudspersons may be former executive officers of other corpora-
tions, retired judges, lawyers,174 accountants, public officials, and academi-
cians. The board ombudsperson would operate most effectively with an open
and inquiring mind and not a mind influenced by long association with the
corporation's way of doing things. Moreover, unlike corporate ombuds-
persons, she would have ready access to corporate books and records, busi-
ness meetings, and employees at all levels of the corporation.
The need for independent, outside persons to perform the board ombuds-
person function is supported by the identity of ombudspersons chosen by
corporations to monitor ethical business conduct in the defense and finance
industries. The board ombudsperson's responsibilities include this subject.
Some signatories of the Defense Industry Initiatives on Business Ethics and
Conduct, including McDonnell Douglas Corporation and General Dynamics
Corporation, have appointed ombudspersons to assure ethical business con-
duct. 75 An independent ombudsperson, a retired Army colonel who was
previously employed as the Army's chief trial attorney, was appointed as an
ombudsperson by one such signatory. 176 In the finance industry, Kidder
Peabody & Company, in response to an insider trading scandal, hired a
partner of a New York law firm on an outside consulting basis to serve as
an ombudsperson. 11 This attorney explains that "[i]t's desirable to have
someone [as ombudsperson] with a little distance and perceived independ-
ence." 178 Even in some labor situations, corporations have hired outside or
"contract" ombudspersons to deal with issues relating to downsizing. 179
These ombudspersons are not long-standing employees of the corpora-
tion and, therefore, can be distinguished from most ombudspersons con-
cerned with employee-related issues. However, Kidder Peabody's attorney-
173. Accord Greenfield, supra note 165, at 19.
174. Id. ("Ideally, the corporate ombudsman would be a lawyer with substantial
business sophistication capable of interacting with and obtaining the respect of the board.").
175. Martin, supra note 154, at 42.
176. Id.
177. See 1d. at 42-43; see also Futter, supra note 157, at 42-43 (discussing appointment
by Drexel Burnham Lambert of Judge Muligan as its ombudsperson).
178. Martin, supra note 154, at 43.
179. OMBuDsmAN HANBOOK, supra note 152, at 1-9; Trocchio, supra note 162, at 36.
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ombudsperson or his law firm may have performed, or expected in the
future to perform, services for Kidder Peabody. Top executives of Kidder
Peabody may also have had a substantial role in selecting the attorney-
ombudsperson and may have been more concerned with "perceived," rather
than actual, independence. The attorney-ombudsperson did not serve full-
time. In contrast, the board ombudsperson proposed in this Article would
work full-time, would meet strict eligibility criteria concerning independ-
ence, and would be appointed by truly independent directors. She would
have full access to corporate information and the corporation's employees
and would have a broader range of subject area responsibilities.
D. Compensation, Tenure, and Liability of Corporate and
Board Ombudspersons
A study based on questionnaire responses of private-sector ombuds-
persons shows that ombudspersons' salaries (excluding benefits and bo-
nuses) ranged in 1986 from $25,000 to more than $100,000, with $75,000
being the median figure.1" The typical (median) budget of an ombuds-
person in 1986 was $100,000, with a range from $5000 to $350,000.11
Salaries varied depending on the ombudsperson's position within the organi-
zation, her prior salary, the nature of the organization, and the number of
employees served by the ombudsperson. 1 2
The board ombudsperson's compensation should be determined by the
conflicts board (or independent directors on the unitary board) in an amount
sufficient to attract well-qualified and motivated ombudspersons. Ombuds-
persons should not be compensated by a method that would affect their
independence adversely. I recommend a fixed salary rather than a salary
based on some percentage of the CEO's salary, corporate profits, or stock
value of the corporation, all of which may pose conflicts for the board
ombudsperson. The board ombudsperson's performance should periodically
be reviewed by independent directors, and her compensation should be
revised accordingly.
Corporations hire corporate ombudspersons either for fixed or indefi-
nite terms;" some hire employees near retirement."8 Indefinite terms and
mid-career assignments can impact an ombudsperson's independence. Long
terms of office could also produce a "coziness" between the ombudsperson
180. Ziegenfuss et al., supra note 155, at 79.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. OMBuDSMAN HANDBOOK, supra note 152, at 5-3, 5-4.
184. Id. at 1-9, 5-4; Zetlin, supra note 156, at 52.
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and management."s Board ombudspersons should, therefore, be outside
persons, as previously described, and should be appointed for fixed, nonre-
newable terms, possibly not exceeding three years.'I These terms can be
analogized to the rotating assignments of external auditors.
The liability of ombudspersons for dereliction of duty should be the
same as for any other employee of the corporation. The board ombuds-
person's responsibilities, however, are not determined by senior execu-
tives but by the conflicts board (or the independent directors of a unitary
board).
IV. Foreign Systems
In evaluating the dual board proposal of this Article, business persons
will inevitably comment that two-board systems have been tried in other
countries. Foreign two-board systems, however, differ significantly from
the dual board structure proposed in this Article. Foreign systems attempt
to separate supervision from management, but do not take sufficient account
of the importance of independence to effective conflicts monitoring.
Foreign systems also place all nonmanagement functions in one board
unlike the dual board, which allocates these functions among two boards.
In this Part, I discuss two different two-board systems - the German two-
tiered board structure"8 and the Japanese two-board structure, which con-
sists of a board of directors and a board of auditors."' I compare these
structures with each other, with unitary boards, and with the proposed dual
board. I also compare the qualifications, functions, and responsibilities of
members of the Japanese board of auditors with those of the board ombuds-
person proposed in this Article.
185. Greenfield, supra note 165, at 19.
186. Greenfield proposes a nonrenewable, three-year term. See id. Futter proposes
a five-year, nonrenewable term. See Futter, supra note 157, at 39.
187. THE GERMAN STOcK CORPORATION ACT §§ 76, 95 (Hannes Schneider & Martin
Heidenhain tram., 1996); ARETZ, supra note 8, at 99-120; CHARKHAM, supra note 8, at 17-
25; DORRESTEUN ET AL., supra note 8, at 112-14; MArrLAND-WALKER, supra note 8, at
163-66; Conard, supra note 8, at 1464-70; Hopt, supra note 8, at 1344-45; Meier-Schatz,
supra note 8, at 443-44; Schmalenbach, supra note 8, at 110; Lo, supra note 8, at 239-40.
188. See Act Regarding Exceptional Rules of the Commercial Code Concerning Audit-
ing, Etc., of Stock Corporations, Law No. 22 of 1974 (Japan), as amended, reprinted in 2
JAPAN Bus. L.J. 443 (H. Nakatsu trans., 1981); The Commercial Code, Law No. 48 of
1899 (Japan), as amended (Zentaro Kitagawa trans., 1994); CHARKHAM, supra note 8, at
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A. Germany's Corporate Two-Tiered Board Structure
Private corporations with five hundred or more employees and public
corporations organized under German law are required to have a two-tiered
board structure.18 9 This structure places supervisory functions in the first-tier
board, the aufsichtsrat (supervisory board), and management functions in the
vorstand, the second-tier board (management board)."9 °
The organization of this two-board system is similar to current U.S.
unitary boards. The basic division is between supervision and management
functions. In the United States, the board of directors is designed to super-
vise management. Managerial functions are performed by top executive
officers or, in some cases, by executive committees composed of the
corporation's senior executives officers. The German supervisory board is
analogous to the U.S. board of directors because it also supervises manage-
ment. 191 The management board, which consists mainly of executive officers
of the corporation, provides managerial services." 9 The force of the analogy
between the U.S. unitary board structure and the German two-tiered board
system is further illustrated by the line relationship between the supervisory
body and management. U.S. boards appoint and determine the compensation
of senior executives. Likewise, the German supervisory board appoints"9
and determines the compensation194 of directors on the management board.
The German supervisory board, however, has less control over manage-
ment and the corporation than the U.S. board has. Whereas the U.S. board
of directors may intervene and manage the corporation if it so desires, the
German supervisory board may not do soJ.9 Managerial responsibilities may
not be assumed by the German supervisory board."9 The powers of the
German supervisory board are limited to consenting to specific types of
transactions requiring the supervisory board's consent,1" including the
extension of credit by the corporation to management board directors, ' and
approving or objecting to the corporation's financial statements and to the
189. See CHARKHAM, supra note 8, at 17-18; DORRESTELIN, supra note 8, at 109, 112.
190. See CHARKHAm, supra note 8, at 17-18; MAITLAND-WALKER, supra note 8, at
163, 165.
191. TiHi GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT § 111(1).
192. Id. §§ 76(1), 78.
193. Id. § 84(1); Conard, supra note 8, at 1465.
194. THE GER AN STOCK CORPORATION ACT § 87(1); Conard, supra note 8, at 1465.
195. THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION Acr § 114(4); Conard, supra note 8, at 1465.
196. THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT § 111(4).
197. Id.
198. Id. § 89(1).
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allocation of profits to dividends and reserves." Moreover, the German
supervisory board may not remove members of the management board during
their terms, which are often for five years,m except "for cause.""' Cause
requires a showing of gross breaches of fiduciary duties or inability to
manage the corporation properly. The U.S. board has greater flexibility and
may usually remove senior executives of the corporation for any reason.
Thus, the U.S. board has greater control over management than does the
German supervisory board. Both boards, however, mainly perform supervi-
sory rather than management functions.
The U.S. board of directors and the German board structure are also
similar in that both conflicts monitoring and other relational roles are ex-
pected to be performed by the same board. In performing its relational
duties, the German supervisory board accommodates employee participa-
tion.2°2 Detailed statutory provisions specify the appropriate number of
employees that must be on the supervisory board and their qualifications and
manner of selection to the board.'m Bankers or other persons who are
selected by banks are also present on German supervisory boards.' 4 This
bank involvement derives from the deposited voting rights system whereby
German corporate shares, usually in bearer form, are deposited with banks
and voted on by them.' A 1988 study of thirty-two of Germany's one
hundred largest quoted firms with approximately a quarter of the market's
nominal capital revealed that banks collectively represented 82.67% of all
votes present at shareholder meetings and that the biggest three banks ac-
counted for 45% of these votes.W6
199. Id. § 171.
200. Id. § 84(1); CHARKHAM, supra note 8, at 21.
201. THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT § 84(3).
202. See id. § 96; see also An Act Concerning Co-Determination of Employees of May
4, 1976, reprinted in THE GERMAN CO-DETERMINATION ACT (Hannes Schneider & David
J. Kingsman eds. & trans., 1976); Michael Gruson & Wienand Meilicke, The New Co-
Determination Law in Germany, 32 Bus. LAw. 571, 573 (1977); Benjamin A. Streeter, Ill,
Co-Determination in West Germany - Through the Best (and Worst) of Tmes, 58 CH.-
KENT L. REV. 981, 1001 (1982).
203. THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT § 96.
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54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 91 (1997)
U.S. law does not provide for employee participation on the boards of
U.S. corporations. Moreover, bankers play less of a role in selecting
persons to the board. Shares of U.S. corporations are in registered form,
and although many of those are held in street names (including bank nominee
names), elaborate procedures are required by law to encourage voting of
those shares by beneficial owners or trustees.' U.S. boards, however, are
composed of a high percentage of outside directors"8 that are selected to
perform a variety of functions, including providing advice, information, and
status to the corporation as well as engaging in conflicts monitoring. I Over
two-thirds of U.S. boards of directors of large industrial corporations are
composed of outside directors.210 Both the German supervisory board and
the U.S. board of directors provide a variety of relational functions for the
corporation.
In addition to performing a variety of relational functions, the German
and U.S. boards are expected to perform conflicts monitoring. The German
supervisory board is responsible for the supervision of management21' and is
obligated to determine the compensation212 and extension of credit by the
corporation to members of the management board.213 The German supervi-
sory board also represents the corporation in and out of court against the
management board.2"4 The business and affairs of U.S. corporations must
be managed by, or under the direction of, corporate boards.2 5
The U.S. board of directors and the German supervisory board, how-
ever, are impeded in their ability to perform conflicts monitoring effectively.
A significant percentage of U.S. board members are inside directors.2 6 In
fact, CEOs often serve on corporate boards. CEOs often act as chairmen of
the board217 and determine the board's agenda and what information will be
distributed to other directors.2 8 Moreover, some outside directors have
207. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-13 (1996); id. § 240.14b-1; id. § 240.14b-2; American
Stock Exchange Rules 575-77, 2 Am. Stock Ex. Guide (CCII) 9528, 9529, at 2708-17
(1996); New York Stock Exchange Rules 451-52, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide (CCII) 2451, 2452,
at 3805-15 (1996).
208. See KORN/FERRY INT'L, supra note 78, at 10.
209. See supra text accompanying note 35.
210. See KORN/FERRY INT'L, supra note 78, at 10.
211. THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT § 111(1).
212. Id. § 87(1).
213. Id. § 89.
214. Id. § 112.
215. See supra note 147.
216. KORN/FERRY INT'L, supra note 78, at 10.
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business and other relationships with the corporation or its management" 9
that interfere with their ability to provide effective conflicts monitoring. The
German supervisory board may not contain members of the management
board,22° but may consist of persons with professional and business relation-
ships with the corporation,"1 including employees'2 and creditors of the
corporation.m Thus, both boards contain persons with conflicts of interest
that impede effective conflicts monitoring.
In conclusion, U.S. boards of directors and German two-tiered boards
are similar in their attempt to separate management from supervision and in
placing conflicts monitoring and other relational functions in the same board.
They both have drawbacks in performing conflicts monitoring because of the
characteristics of board members expected to perform this function. Unlike
the U.S. board, however, the German supervisory board's powers are more
limited. The German supervisory board also may be less effective than the
U.S. board in providing some relational roles because members of the
management board are excluded from membership on that board. 
2 4
The dual board structure proposed in this Article differs from the
two-tiered board system used by German corporations in the following
aspects:
" The proposed dual board provides for the separation of supervision
from management, but unlike the German system, this is not accom-
plished through a separate board that performs management functions.
In this respect, the dual board is more like the U.S. board, which
typically does not manage the corporation, but has the authority to do
so. Management authority is delegated by the U.S. unitary board to
executive officers of the corporation. The dual board also delegates
managerial power to executive officers.
" All nonmanagement functions are placed in the same board under the
German system. The dual board system assigns conflicts monitoring
to one board and other relational functions to the business review
board.
" The German system provides for employee participation on the super-
visory board. The dual board could similarly facilitate employee par-
ticipation by providing for employee directors on the business review
219. Baysinger & Butler, Revolution Versus Evolution, supra note 17, at 569.
220. THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT §§ 100, 105.
221. Id. § 114.
222. Id. § 96.
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board. Benefits of the dual board systems may be obtained, however,
without adopting the German system of employee codetermination.
The German supervisory board consists of a mix of different kinds of
directors, except that top executives (members of the management
board) are excluded from this board. In contrast, the business review
board would contain top executives of the corporation as wel as other
kinds of directors. Because top executives may not serve on the
German supervisory board, it would be less effective in performing
some relational functions than the business review board, which does
contain such executives.
" Conflicts monitoring by the German supervisory board must be
performed by nonindependent directors on its board. The conflicts
board is composed solely of independent directors.
" The German supervisory board's authority to monitor is limited by
legal rules, such as its inability to remove members of the manage-
ment board except for cause. The conflicts board is not subject to
these limitations.'
" In the German system, one board appoints members of the other
board and determines their compensation. Each board in the dual
board structure makes its own nominations and determines its own
compensation.' The conflicts board is the premier board only
through its ability to hire and fire the CEO and other executive offi-
cers of the corporation.' m
The German supervisory board has some features in common with the
dual board's conflicts board. It has access to the books and records of the
corporation' and may hire experts 9 (called inspectors)' to review these
documents. It has effective authority over some areas involving managerial
conflicts of interest, such as the hiring and removal of managers and deter-
mining compensation and loans by the corporation to them." Both boards
are entitled to report on various subjects from the other board"2 and may
225. See supra Part ll.A.2.a (discussing role of conflicts board in executive selection
and compensation).
226. See supra Part ILA.2.b (noting that each board should determine its own compen-
sation).
227. See supra Part II.A.2.a (explaining dominance of conflicts board).
228. THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION ACT § 111(2).
229. Id.
230. CHARKHAM, supra note 8, at 22.
231. See supra notes 193, 198.
232. THE GERMAN STOCK CORPORATION AT § 90.
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represent the corporation in actions by or against the other board's mem-
bers. 3  These features of the dual board system, therefore, should not
cause concern because of their novelty.
B. Japan's Corporate Board of Directors and Board of Auditors
Large corporations in Japan have two boards, a board of auditors and
a board of directors. In 1993, Japanese law was amended to strengthen the
powers and duties of statutory auditors (kansayaku).? This amendment
required large corporations to establish a board of auditors consisting of at
least three auditors." Statutory auditors should not be confused with
external or internal accounting auditors concerned with auditing the corpo-
ration's finances. Statutory auditors "audit the directors' performance of
their duties." 6  Japanese boards of directors often consist of a large
number of directors who are usually inside (employee) directors of the cor-
poration. These boards are often ceremonial, with control residing in a top
management committee called the jomukai. 7
The Japanese two-board system differs substantially from the German
two-tiered board. While both the Japanese board of directors and the
German management board consist mainly of inside directors, the German
management board is more actively involved in the management of the
corporation." The German supervisory board is also different from the
Japanese board of auditors. The board of auditors is not intended to
perform relational functions. Unlike the German supervisory board, the
Japanese board of auditors is not composed of various employee or bank
directors. It is really not a board of "directors" at all. Other than deter-
mining audit policy and methods for investigating the business and assets
of the corporation, 9 the board of auditors does not direct the corporation
in its business.
233. Id. § 112.
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The role of the statutory auditor is mainly restricted to reporting on
certain subjects to the board of directors' and to the shareholders" of the
corporation. In some situations, however, the statutory auditor may de-
mand that directors cease certain activities 2 and may represent the corpora-
tion in actions by or against directors.'4 3 However, the scope of the statu-
tory auditor's responsibilities is limited. The statutory auditor focuses on
directoral violations of law, ordinances, and the corporation's articles of
incorporation.'
Although the board of auditors is expected to assure legal compliance
by directors of the corporation, which is also one of the responsibilities of
the conflicts board, the board of auditors, unlike the conflicts board, is
poorly composed to perform that function. Although the auditors may not
be currently employed by the corporation, 5 only one auditor is required
not to have been employed by the corporation for at least five years prior
to taking office.' No requirements exist concerning employment of audi-
tors by the corporation after serving their terms. Moreover, the law does
not preclude other business relationships with the corporation or its manage-
ment by auditors during their term of office.
Although the law has been strengthened to subject auditors to liability
for acting in bad faith and in gross neglect of their duties, 7 the ability of
auditors to perform their functions effectively is problematic until greater
attention is given to their independence. Statutory auditor positions are
normally filled by retiring employees who do not have the status to be on
addition to determining audit policy and methods of investigation, the board of auditors may
also determine "other matters concerning the execution of the duties of the board of
auditors." Id.
240. The Commercial Code § 260-3.
241. Id. §§ 275, 275-3.
242. Id. § 275-2.
243. Id. § 275-4.
244. Id. §§ 260-3, 275, 275-2. After examining proposals and documents to be
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to shareholders matters in those proposals or documents that are "grossly improper." Id.
§ 275. There must be "a likelihood that serious damage might be done" to the corporation
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the corporation's board of directors.' Sometimes the positions are filled
by mid-level directors who are not going to be promoted. 9 These low-
status individuals with long histories with the corporation and its manage-
ment often are ineffective auditors.'
The Japanese two-board system is different from this Article's dual
board proposal in the following ways:
" The dual board structure consists of two boards of "directors." One
board under the Japanese system is a board of "auditors" that has
more limited powers and responsibilities than either board under the
dual board system.
* The Japanese board of directors is composed mainly of inside direc-
tors and thus is more analogous to the German management board
than either the dual board's conflicts or business review boards.
" Independence requirements for members of the board of auditors are
substantially weaker than the standards proposed for the conflicts
board.
* The business review board will most likely consist of a substantial
number of outside directors, whereas the Japanese board of directors
is composed largely of inside directors.
The Japanese board system has some similarities to the dual board.
The board of auditors is given access to books and records of the corpora-
tion." It may also represent the corporation in actions by or against direc-
tors of the corporation. 2 Moreover, each board is legally entitled to nomi-
nate its own members.2n
Also, the role of the board ombudsperson can be compared to that of
the Japanese statutory auditor. The board ombudsperson would be con-
cerned with a broader range of issues than the statutory auditor. The
ombudsperson would gather information on conflict of interest transactions,
changes of control, and ethical practices, in addition to information on
248. CHARKHAM, supra note 8, at 93; Survey, supra note 9, at 159.
249. Survey, supra note 9, at 159.
250. CHARKHAM, supra note 8, at 93; Survey, supra note 9, at 159.
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auditing and legal compliance issues. The board ombudsperson, however,
would not have the power of the statutory auditor. The ombudsperson
could neither demand that directors cease to act nor represent the corpora-
tion in an action by or against directors, unless authorized to do so by the
conflicts board. Also, whereas the statutory auditor may attend and speak
at board meetings,' the ombudsperson may ,attend those meetings only to
collect information. Any further participation by the ombudsperson at these
meetings is a matter for the conflicts board to approve.
The board ombudsperson would report to the conflicts board, which
has the ultimate responsibility for conflicts monitoring. This structure
separates information gathering and evaluation from action based on that
information. The structure facilitates the ombudsperson's job, which is
limited to gathering, evaluating, and reporting information to an independ-
ent conflicts board that is responsible for decision making. It would be
beneficial to borrow from Japanese law a requirement that managers imme-
diately report to the ombudsperson facts they discover that "give rise to an
apprehension that significant damage may be incurred by the stock com-
pany,,,25 but otherwise the board ombudsperson structure is preferable.
Under the Japanese two-board system, the Japanese auditor is responsible
for both functions, gathering and acting on the basis of the information that
he finds. In addition, unlike the Japanese auditor, the board ombudsperson
must meet strict eligibility criteria concerning his independence.
Conclusion
The dual board attends to various aspects of the corporation's environ-
ment. The dual board maximizes the possibility of fulfilling the many
functions that a board is well situated to perform. Unlike the unitary
board, the dual board divides its functions among two boards, each more
capable of performing a subset of functions than the unitary board. These
relational functions are divided into conflicts monitoring, which requires
independent directors, and other business review monitoring functions,
which benefit from the participation of both inside directors and noninde-
pendent outside directors.
Board systems that separate supervision and management are supple-
mented through the dual board structure by a system that allocates supervi-
sory functions among two boards. The dual board structure implements a
more finely tuned system that recognizes the variety of functions that
boards perform and are expected to perform by corporations. The dual
254. The Commercial Code § 260-3.
255. Id. § 274-2.
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board proposal takes seriously what boards do and the appropriate qualifica-
tions of directors who serve on them.
The board ombudsperson proposal is applicable to both dual boards
and unitary boards. Board ombudspersons would be selected by independ-
ent directors on these boards to gather and evaluate information on matters
relevant to the boards' responsibilities. By decreasing the substantial infor-
mational dependence that directors have on corporate management, the
board ombudsperson would assist independent directors in more effectively
monitoring situations in which the interests of managers conflict with the
interests of shareholders.

